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While the Supreme Court approved of the use of charging threats nearly
thirty years ago in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, a more recent line of cases has subtly
undermined key premises of that landmark decision. In order to induce guilty
pleas, prosecutors might use any of a number of different tactics. A prosecutor
might, for instance, charge aggressively in the first instance and then promise to
drop the most serious charges in return for a guilty plea to a lesser offense.
Bordenkircher addressed the mirror-image of this tactic: the prosecutor filed
relatively minor charges at first, but then threatened to pursue more serious
charges if the defendant did not plead guilty. The Supreme Court approved of
such charging threats based on two considerations: the efficiency benefits of
resolving cases by plea instead of jury trial, and the possibility that prosecutors
would evade a ban on threats by charging more aggressively in the first instance.
The Court’s reasoning, however, is inconsistent with Apprendi v. New Jersey
and its progeny. Apprendi rejected the use of both efficiency considerations and
evasion concerns as grounds for impairing access to juries. Apprendi instead
emphasized a need for robust checks and balances within the criminal justice
system. Because the Apprendi line of cases addressed sentencing procedures,
not plea bargaining, their relevance to Bordenkircher has thus far escaped
notice. The Article argues, however, that the Court should now overturn
Bordenkircher in light of the values it embraced in Apprendi. The Article also
proposes a new test for evaluating the constitutionality of charging threats.
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It is an iconic case from the era when plea bargaining finally emerged from
the shadows and acquired clear constitutional legitimacy.1 In 1973, a Kentucky
grand jury indicted Paul Hayes on a charge of uttering a forged instrument in the
amount of $88.30, an offense punishable by two to ten years in prison.2 During
plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered to recommend a term of five years if
Hayes pled guilty, but, otherwise, threatened to charge Hayes under the Kentucky
Habitual Criminal Act, which would subject Hayes to a mandatory life term
based on his two prior felony convictions.3 When Hayes rejected the deal, he
was charged as threatened.4 Eventually, he lost at trial and was sentenced

1

See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (rejecting constitutional rule “that would
drive the practice of plea bargaining back into the shadows from which it has so recently
emerged”). For a leading history of plea bargaining from its first systematic use in the nineteenth
century to the present, see GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003).
2
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 359.
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pursuant to the Act.5 Thus, for his decision to go to trial, Hayes suffered an
extraordinary penalty, as his sentence ballooned from about five years to life.
The case, styled Bordenkircher v. Hayes, created a dilemma when it reached
the Supreme Court. On the one hand, as the Court had established in a recent
line of cases, “[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly
allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.”6 Because
Hayes indisputably had a constitutional right to his jury trial, the prosecutor’s
decision to penalize him in such a severe fashion for exercising the right was
troubling at the very least.
On the other hand, in another recent line of cases, the Court had endorsed the
guilty plea and plea bargain as “important components of this country’s criminal
justice system.”7 A ruling in favor of Hayes might bring down the whole edifice.
The Court could see no principled means of distinguishing among plea
inducements: a “threat” (like the prosecutor’s threat to charge Hayes as a
recidivist) could easily be restructured as an “offer” (e.g., the prosecutor might
have charged Hayes as a recidivist from the outset and then offered to dismiss the
charge if Hayes pled guilty to the underlying offense). Thus, if the Court were to
prohibit charging threats, the Court could not stop there, but would have to
regulate all plea inducements—a radical step the Court was unwilling to make.8
Accordingly, the Court rejected Hayes’ claim.9
But is it really so hard to distinguish threats from offers? Although its
potential connections to Bordenkircher have thus far escaped notice, a much
more recent line of cases casts doubt on crucial premises of the earlier decision.
Since 2000, Apprendi v. New Jersey10 and its progeny11 have rejuvenated the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Even though these decisions dealt with
sentencing procedures, not plea bargaining, they have nonetheless undercut
Bordenkircher in at least two respects. First, and most obviously, Apprendi’s
vision of a robust role for the jury in the criminal justice system is inconsistent
5

Id.
Id. at 363 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 (1969)).
7
Id. at 361 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)).
8
See id. at 364 (“While confronting a defendant with the risk more severe punishment clearly may
have a discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these
difficult choices is an inevitable—and permissible—attribute of any system which tolerates and
encourages the negotiation of pleas.” (quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted)).
9
Id. at 365.
10
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
11
See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004).
6
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with Bordenkircher’s endorsement of guilty pleas as the most desirable method
of resolving criminal cases. Second, and more subtly, the Apprendi decisions
recognize the significance of the form of a government action. Two different
government actions producing the same result may be perceived quite differently
based on differences in their form. The Court’s reasoning in this regard, which
resonates with recent work in cognitive psychology, points the way to a
principled distinction between threats and offers.
Building on these observations, the central thesis of this Article is easily
stated: in the interests of jurisprudential consistency, the five Justices constituting
the majority in Apprendi—all of whom remain on the new Roberts Court—
should, if given the opportunity, vote to overturn Bordenkircher.12 The thesis is
considerably easier to state than to defend—if for no other reason than that the
only member of the “Apprendi Five” who was on the Court in 1978 (Justice
Stevens) actually voted with the majority in Bordenkircher. Yet, as we will see,
Stevens subtly backed away from Bordenkircher in a later opinion,13 and good
arguments may be made that he should now reject even his watered-down
version of Bordenkircher as inconsistent with his Apprendi writings.
In order to make these arguments, we shall have to puzzle over one the
ongoing points of controversy surrounding the Apprendi decisions: whether they
constitute, as Justice O’Connor dismissively characterized them, “doctrinaire
formalism.”14 The question has attracted a growing body of scholarly
commentary.15 I will attempt to illuminate the issues by distinguishing between
12

While I argue that the Court ought to reject one particular form of plea inducement, I do not seek
in this Article to join the long-standing academic debate over the merits of plea-bargaining
generally. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932-34 (1983) (summarizing
arguments against plea bargaining); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market
System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309 (1983) (“[P]lea bargaining is desirable, not just defensible, if
the system attempts to maximize deterrence from a given commitment of resources.”); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L. J. 1979, 1979 (1992) (“[P]lea bargaining
seriously impairs the public interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separation of
the guilty from the innocent.”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1910 (1992) (“Properly understood, classical contract theory supports the
freedom to bargain over criminal punishment.”).
13
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
14
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 321 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
15
Most commentators on this issue have echoed O’Connor’s criticism. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen &
Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional Command or Constitutional
Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 202 (2005) (“To the extent what emerges from the [Apprendi]
cases is something other than drafting advice, it will most likely redound to the detriment of
defendants, a curious result in a line of cases ostensibly designed to protect defendants’ rights.”);
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two types of formalism and two types of consequentialism. First, I distinguish
“rule-structure formalism” from “consequence-indifference formalism.” The
former principle indicates that, in establishing the boundaries of legal rights and
duties, courts ought to favor bright-line tests over vague standards.16 The latter
indicates that courts ought to decide cases based on some facially neutral
principle, like plain textual meaning or original intent, without regard to the realworld consequences of the decision. It is this type of formalism that Justice
O’Connor had in mind with her criticism of Apprendi. However, while the
Apprendi Five undoubtedly employ rule-structure formalism, and also sometimes
don the mantle of originalism, they just as clearly believe they are doing
something that materially enhances the fairness and democratic accountability of
the criminal justice system. And because these beliefs are at least plausible, the
Apprendi decisions should not be dismissed as indifferent to consequences.
I further distinguish between “rational-actor consequentialism” and “biasedactor consequentialism.” Any attempt to consider real-world consequences in
judicial decision-making must rely on some basic assumptions about the way that
people behave in the real world. Law and economics scholars have long
employed rational-actor models to predict the social consequences of changes in
legal rules. These models assume that people seek to maximize their utility from
a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information in
order to do so.17 A competing approach, sometimes labeled behavioral law and
economics (“BLE”), relaxes these assumptions and attempts to take into account
how “‘real people’ differ from homo economicus.”18 Of particular note, the “real
Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice
Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 186 (2005) (“[Justice
Scalia] has done a disservice in Blakely . . . by exalting formalism so far above humility,
practicality, and plain old common sense.”); Frank O. Bowman, III, Function Over Formalism: A
Provisional Theory of the Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 17 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 1,
2 (2004) (criticizing “narrow formalism” of Blakely); Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 615, 638
(2002) (characterizing Apprendi as “highly formalistic”); Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of
Sentencing Guidelines, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 783 (2002) (“[T]he Court will not be able, through
formalistic attacks from the fringe, to diminish the preeminent discretion of the legislature to define
crimes.”). For a more positive view, see Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1486 (2001) (“[T]he formalism of Apprendi is not pointless after all.”).
16
See Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 749, 755 (2006) (contrasting rules and standards).
17
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998) (citing GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976)).
18
Id.
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people” of BLE exhibit various forms of cognitive bias, such as loss aversion,
that is, the tendency to weigh losses more heavily than gains.19
As we will see, the consequentialism of the Bordenkircher majority rests on
rational-actor assumptions, while the Bordenkircher dissenters implicitly assume
biased actors. In the Apprendi decisions, these roles are reversed: the majority
employs biased-actor consequentialism, while the dissenters adhere to the
rational-actor model. These different premises are not acknowledged in any of
the cases, but they are readily teased out and help to explain how it is that all of
the Justices seem to be claiming the consequentialist high ground.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I elaborates on the Bordenkircher
dilemma, identifying the competing approaches to resolving the dilemma taken
by the various majority and dissenting opinions in Bordenkircher and an
important follow-up case, United States v. Goodwin.20 Part II discusses a parallel
dilemma addressed by the Apprendi line of cases: to what extent should the Court
defer to legislative decisions about which facts in a criminal case are “elements”
(the determination of which implicates the full range of criminal procedure
protections) and which facts are mere sentencing considerations (as to which
procedures may be far more relaxed)? Countering Justice O’Connor’s charge of
“doctrinaire formalism,” this Part offers a consequentialist account of the
Apprendi line of cases, in which they can be seen through the lens of BLE as
advancing democratic, libertarian, and fairness values in the criminal justice
system. Part III brings together the Bordenkircher and Apprendi lines of cases,
detailing their inconsistencies. Part IV proposes a new rule of constitutional law
that the Apprendi Five should adopt if given a fresh opportunity to address the
issue of prosecutorial charging threats. The test is consistent with the rulestrucuture formalism of Apprendi, while also taking more seriously the jury-trial
right than the rules adopted in Bordenkircher and Goodwin.
I. THE BORDENKIRCHER DILEMMA
Prosecutors often seek to induce guilty pleas by offering defendants a benefit
in return for their plea, such as the dismissal of one charge in exchange for a plea
to a lesser-included offense. Bordenkircher, though, involved a different sort of
inducement: a threat to bring a greater charge. The case presented a dilemma for
the Court because it represented a collision between two established principles.
On the one hand, the “vindictiveness” principle, adopted by the Court in such

19
20

Id. at 1484.
457 U.S. 368 (1982).
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cases as Blackledge v. Perry,21 forbade prosecutors and judges from penalizing
defendants for the exercise of procedural rights. But, on the other hand, the
Court had also recently come to recognize the important social benefits of guilty
pleas and plea-bargaining, which facilitated the efficient resolution of cases and
created opportunities for defendants to receive more lenient treatment.22
To be more specific, the Bordenkircher dilemma involved at least three
difficult, overlapping questions. First, should the law distinguish between threats
of harsh treatment and offers of lenient treatment when, at least in principle,
threats could be easily restructured as offers? Second, how much weight should
be given to the social benefits of the plea-inducement system? (This question
was especially pressing if threats were indistinguishable from offers, in which
case Paul Hayes’s claim might call into question all forms of plea inducement.)
And, third, if defendants did have some sort of constitutional protection from
unduly coercive plea inducements, how exactly would the right be structured?
The three opinions in Bordenkircher (a majority opinion by Justice Stewart
and dissents by Justices Blackmun and Powell) suggest three different ways to
resolve the tripartite dilemma. This Part considers each of the opinions, then
assesses the majority and dissenting opinions in Goodwin. Although Goodwin
did not involve a prosecutorial charging threat, the opinions nonetheless
addressed the meaning of Bordenkircher at some length. Indeed, the Goodwin
majority opinion (authored by Justice Stevens, a member of the Apprendi Five)
characterized Bordenkircher in terms that were startlingly similar to Justice
Powell’s dissent in the earlier case. Meanwhile, Justice Brennan’s dissent in
Goodwin suggests a fourth approach to resolving the Bordenkircher dilemma—
the one that turns out to be the closest in spirit to the Apprendi decisions.
A. Bordenkircher
1. Majority Opinion: A Rule of Non-Interference With Plea Inducements
In the majority’s view, Bordenkircher’s outcome resulted inevitably from the
social desirability of plea inducements. The majority saw no meaningful
distinction between threats and offers,23 and so framed Hayes’ argument as an
attack on plea inducements generally.24 Observing that “the guilty plea and the
21

417 U.S. 21 (1974).
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361 (1978) (discussing benefits of plea-bargaining).
23
Id. at 363.
24
See id. at 364-65 (“To hold that the prosecutors’ desire to induce a guilty plea is an unjustifiable
standard, which . . .may play no part in his charging decision, would contradict the very premises
that underlie the concept of plea-bargaining itself.”).
22
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often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country’s
criminal justice system,”25 the majority could find no fault in a prosecutor’s
desire to secure a plea using his broad charging discretion,26 so long as the
minimal requirements of probable cause were satisfied.27 The majority
acknowledged that the threat of more severe punishment “may have a
discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of his trial rights,” but
nonetheless concluded that “the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an
inevitable—and permissible—attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates
and encourages the negotiation of pleas.”28 The majority thus suggested no
circumstances in which a prosecutor’s filing of otherwise permissible charges
pursuant to a plea-inducement threat would raise constitutional problems.
2. Blackmun’s Dissent: Questioning the Legitimacy of the Plea-Inducement
Motive
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, found the
vindictiveness principle controlling. Notwithstanding the unquestioned social
benefits of guilty pleas, Blackmun argued that it was unconstitutional for a
prosecutor purposely to impose a penalty on a defendant as a result of the
defendant’s decision to contest the prosecutor’s case at trial.29 In order to protect
defendants from vindictiveness, he proposed a burden-shifting test that focused
on the prosecutor’s intent:
[W]hen plea negotiations, conducted in the face of the less serious charge
under the first indictment, fail, charging by a second indictment a more
serious crime for the same conduct creates a ‘strong inference’ of
vindictiveness. . . . I . . . do not understand why . . . due process does not
require that the prosecution justify its action on some basis other than
discouraging [the defendant] from the exercise of his right to a trial.30

25

Id. at 361.
See id. at 364 (“[B]y tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has
necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor’s interest at
the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty.”).
27
See id. (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).
28
Id. at 364.
29
Id. at 367 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30
Id.
26
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Blackmun recognized that his approach might cause prosecutors to
restructure threats as offers.31 In other words, rather than employ a “low-to-high”
charging strategy, some prosecutors might switch to “high-to-low.” Blackmun
further recognized that judges would not be able to detect and sanction such
“overcharging.”32 Yet, Blackmun believed it was preferable for prosecutors to
employ high-to-low rather than low-to-high; the switch would protect those
defendants who were most determined to go to trial from the most severe
reprisals, facilitate public oversight of plea-inducement practices, and give
defendants a fairer chance to challenge the enhanced charges.33 Blackmun, in
short, concluded that there were meaningful differences between threats and
offers. (His analysis will be discussed in more detail in Part III below.)
3. Powell’s Dissent: Deference With a Difference
Justice Powell staked out the middle ground. On the one hand, he agreed
with the majority that plea inducements are “essential to the functioning of the
criminal justice system,” and that, in general, prosecutors should be “accorded
the widest discretion” in attempting to secure pleas.34 He was unwilling,
however, to endorse the majority’s view that prosecutors had an entirely free
hand to enhance charges in response to a defendant’s failure to plead guilty. At
some point, the new charge might become “unreasonable and not in the public
interest,”35 and it was at that point that Powell would join Blackmun in
condemning the prosecutor’s motives. Put differently, the prosecutor’s desire to
penalize the exercise of trial rights was immaterial as long as the resulting
charges were also justified by society’s legitimate interest in punishing the
defendant’s underlying criminal conduct; however, “[i]mplementation of a
strategy calculated solely to deter the exercise of constitutional rights is not a
constitutionally permissible exercise of discretion.”36
Powell thus proposed a test that focused not on whether the prosecutor
wished to penalize the defendant’s exercise of a right, but on “whether the
prosecutor reasonably might have charged the [defendant with the new crime] in
the first place.”37 On the unique facts of Bordenkircher, where the defendant was
subject to a life sentence for an $88 crime, Powell concluded that the charges
31

Id. at 368 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34
Id. at 672-73 (Powell, J., dissenting).
35
Id. at 371 (Powell, J., dissenting).
36
Id. at 373 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
37
Id. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting).
32
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were not reasonable.38 Thus, while Powell’s approach was more deferential to
prosecutors than Blackmun’s, Powell would have imposed some limitations on
prosecutors in “exceptional case[s].”39
B. Goodwin
Following an altercation with a police officer, Learley Reed Goodwin was
charged with several misdemeanor and petty offenses.40 After plea negotiations
failed, the case was transferred to another prosecutor, who obtained a felony
indictment, thus exposing Goodwin to more severe punishment.41 Convicted at
trial, Goodwin argued on appeal that prosecutors had unconstitutionally retaliated
against him for invoking his right to a jury trial.42 The claim, however, was
rejected by the Supreme Court.
Although Goodwin did not arise from an express threat, the case merits our
attention for two reasons. First, because the Court’s analysis turned on the scope
of the Bordenkircher exception to prior vindictiveness law, Goodwin contains
much commentary on the earlier decision. Second, the Goodwin majority
opinion was authored by Justice Stevens, who later became a key figure in the
Apprendi cases. Before turning to the majority opinion, though, we will begin
with the dissent, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall,
which suggests a fourth distinct approach to vindictiveness.
1. Brennan’s Dissent: The Likelihood-of-Deterrence Test
In Brennan’s view, Bordenkircher was limited to its particular circumstances,
a prosecutor carrying through on a threat made during plea negotiations.43
Outside that context, vindictiveness analysis turned on the questions considered
by the pre-Bordenkircher vindictiveness cases: “Did the elevation of the charges
against [the defendant] pose a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness? Is it possible
that the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a person in [the
defendant’s] position from exercising his statutory and constitutional right to a
jury trial?”44 And, as Brennan saw it, the government’s elevation of charges
against Goodwin did indeed pose such “a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.”45
38

Id. at 370-71 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 372 (Powell, J., dissenting).
40
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 370 (1982).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 372.
43
Id. at 391 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44
Id. at 389-90 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
45
Id. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39
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Thus, under Brennan’s test, the analysis depended not on the prosecutor’s
actual motive, but, rather, on how the prosecutor’s actions might realistically be
viewed by a defendant.46 Even though Brennan had joined Blackmun’s dissent in
Bordenkircher, his opinion in Goodwin actually went a step further, inasmuch as
Blackmun would have given the prosecutor an opportunity to rebut a
presumption of vindictiveness by showing an absence of actual vindictive intent.
(Indeed, as if to underscore the point, Blackmun did not join Brennan’s dissent in
Goodwin, but wrote a concurring opinion.47) In Part IV, I will discuss how
Brennan’s approach might be translated into the express threat setting.
2. Majority Opinion: Powell’s Triumph?
The majority relied on Bordenkircher in rejecting Goodwin’s claim, but, in
doing so, confronted an important difficulty: while Bordenkircher turned on a
perceived need to preserve the plea-inducement system, Goodwin’s claim
presented no direct challenge to the system. Justice Stevens’s solution was to
recharacterize Bordenkircher, not as a case about the benefits of plea
inducements, but as a case about the benefits of broad prosecutorial charging
discretion. That maneuver addressed one difficulty, but opened another: how to
account for Blackledge v. Perry, the leading pre-Bordenkircher case on
prosecutorial vindictiveness, in which the Court had rejected a prosecutor’s
enhancement of charges following a defendant’s exercise of his right to a
retrial.48 In light of Blackledge, charging discretion was clearly not unlimited. In
order to harmonize Blackledge with his take on Bordenkircher, Stevens borrowed
a little from Blackmun’s dissent in Bordenkircher and a lot from Powell’s.
Lending support to this view of Goodwin, Powell (alone among the four
Bordenkircher dissenters) actually joined the majority opinion.
Stevens endorsed the constitutional principle on which Blackledge was based
(an individual “may not be punished for exercising a protected statutory or
constitutional right”49), but saw the real difficulty as one of proof. How could the
courts distinguish between “governmental action that is fully justified as a
legitimate response to perceived criminal conduct” and “governmental action that

46

See id. at 389 (arguing that Blackledge “focused upon the accused’s apprehension of . . .
retaliatory motivation”).
47
Blackmun disagreed with the majority’s approach, but would have nonetheless affirmed the
conviction on the basis that the prosecutor had “dispelled the appearance of vindictiveness” in the
case. Id. at 386 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
48
417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974).
49
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372.
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is an impermissible response to noncriminal, protected activity”50? This is where
Stevens borrowed from Blackmun, specifically, by structuring the regulation of
prosecutorial discretion through a system of presumptions and burden-shifting.
Thus, Blackledge, in Stevens’s account, had established a rebuttable presumption
of vindictiveness based on increased charges in its particular post-trial setting.51
In Bordenkircher, by contrast, “the Court for the first time considered an
allegation of vindictiveness that arose in a pretrial setting,”52 and “made clear
that the mere fact that a defendant refuses to plead guilty and forces the
government to prove its case is insufficient to warrant a presumption that
subsequent changes in the charging decision are unjustified.”53 Stevens felt that
prosecutors could generally be trusted to charge reasonably and without an
improper motive to punish or deter the exercise of procedural rights:
There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting. In the
course of preparing a case for trial, the prosecutor may uncover
additional information that suggests a basis for further prosecution or he
simply may come to realize that information possessed by the State has a
broader significance. . . .
. . . A prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise the broad
discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest
in prosecution. . . . 54
Stevens thus indicated that the key difference between Blackledge and
Bordenkircher was not the plea-inducement context (as the dissenters asserted),
but their post-trial versus pretrial settings. Vindictiveness might be presumed in
at least some post-trial contexts, but it would never be presumed where charges
were increased pretrial.
Stevens’s reluctance, like Powell’s, to presume that prosecutors act with
improper motives differentiates his approach from Blackmun’s. (And the focus
of all three on prosecutorial motivation, as opposed to defendant apprehension,
differentiates their approaches from Brennan’s.) At the same time, there are real
differences (albeit subtle and unacknowledged) between Stevens’s opinion for
the Court in Goodwin and Stewart’s opinion for the Court in Bordenkircher. In
50

Id.
Id. at 376.
52
Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
53
Id. at 382-83.
54
Id. at 381-82.
51
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particular, Bordenkircher recognized no apparent limitation on the prosecutor’s
discretion in pressuring defendants to plead guilty; as long as the charge is
supported by probable cause, the prosecutor can use it. (Indeed, as Powell had
suggested, it is hard to imagine a much clearer case of actual vindictiveness than
Bordenkircher itself, in which the prosecutor sought a life sentence for an $88
crime and made quite clear that he did so as a result of Hayes’ refusal to plead
guilty to the lesser crime.) By contrast, Goodwin stated,
In declining to apply a presumption of vindictiveness, we of course do
not foreclose the possibility that a defendant in an appropriate case might
prove objectively that the prosecutor’s charging decision was motivated
by a desire to punish him for doing something that the law plainly allows
him to do.55
How might this improper motivation be proven in the absence of a
presumption? According to Goodwin, Bordenkircher established that the
prosecutor’s stated intent to induce a guilty plea was not enough:
The fact that the prosecutor threatened the defendant did not prove that
the action threatened was not permissible; the prosecutor’s conduct did
not establish that the additional charges were brought solely to
“penalize” the defendant and could not be justified as a proper exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.56
Put differently, “mixed motives” were inadequate: “A charging decision does not
levy an improper ‘penalty’ unless it results solely from the defendant’s exercise
of a protected legal right, rather than the prosecutor’s normal assessment of the
societal interest in prosecution.”57 Thus, the burden on the defendant was not to
show an intent to induce a guilty plea, but to show an intent to induce a guilty
plea using charges that “could not be justified as a proper exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.”58 Goodwin thus contemplated that vindictiveness
claims would be built around a showing that charges exceeded “the extent of the
societal interest in prosecution.”59 This is, of course, precisely the inquiry that
Powell advocated in his Bordenkircher dissent. Little wonder that he parted
ways with his fellow Bordenkircher dissenters to join the Goodwin majority!
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Id. at 384.
Id. at 380 n.12.
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Id. at 380 n.11 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
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Id. at 380 n.12 (emphasis added).
59
Id. at 382.
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C. Summary
While Goodwin may have muddied the waters a bit, it is still perfectly clear
that a defendant who is penalized, like Paul Hayes, pursuant to a plea-inducement
threat has little or no chance of prevailing on a vindictiveness claim. Nothing in
Goodwin suggested that Bordenkircher was incorrectly decided on its facts, and
few defendants will have facts nearly as compelling as those of Hayes himself.
Moreover, to whatever extent that Powell’s slightly more flexible approach
ultimately prevailed, recall that Powell made clear that judicial interference in the
plea-inducement process should occur “[o]nly in the most exceptional case.”60
Bordenkircher and Goodwin both relied on consequentialist reasoning.
Neither, for instance, engaged in any textual exegesis or assessment of original
intent. Rather, Bordenkircher worried about preserving the benefits offered by
the plea-inducement system to defendants and the public at large, while Goodwin
worried about preserving the prosecutor’s “free[dom] before trial to exercise the
broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest
in prosecution.”61 In light of their respective consequentialist concerns, both
cases mandated a high degree of deference to prosecutorial charging decisions.
Bordenkircher, adopting a somewhat stronger form of deference, employed a
bright-line rule: as long as the charge was supported by probable cause, there was
no vindictiveness problem. Goodwin, by contrast, seemed less consistent with
the ideal of rule-structure formalism, suggesting an inquiry (could the charges
“be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion?”) that implied
prudential, case-by-case balancing of interests. As we will see, the Court initially
adopted, but then decisively rejected, just this sort of rule as it wrestled with the
sentencing factor problem.
II. A PARALLEL DILEMMA: ELEMENTS VERSUS SENTENCING FACTORS
Prior to the 1980’s, sentencing in the United States was largely discretionary:
after a defendant was convicted of a crime, the judge was free to select a sentence
anywhere within a wide statutory range prescribed for the crime.62 The two- to
60

Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 372 (Powell, J. dissenting).
457 U.S. at 382.
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See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225-26 (1993) (describing
traditional federal sentencing practices). I use the term “discretionary sentencing” throughout this
Article in order to avoid confusion surrounding the more common term “indeterminate sentencing.”
See Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L. J. 377, 381-86 (2005)
(discussing terminological difficulties in this area). The latter term is sometimes applied broadly to
any sentencing regime in which judges select sentences within wide ranges, and sometimes more
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ten-year range Paul Hayes initially faced for false uttering in 1973 was
emblematic of such a discretionary system. By contrast, the Kentucky Habitual
Criminal Act, with its mandatory life sentence for certain recidivists, was
aberrational; indeed, Kentucky actually softened the Act while Hayes’ case was
pending63—too late to do Hayes any good, but indicative of the times.
Since the 1970’s, however, American legislatures have adopted a host of
mandatory minimum statutes, binding sentencing guidelines, and other
presumptive sentencing schemes in order to curtail the discretion of sentencing
judges.64 In such regimes, the sentence is largely dictated by the presence of
some fact or group of facts that go beyond what is necessary to establish the
defendant’s legal guilt. For instance, under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act,
the presence of two prior felony convictions mandated a life sentence. In some
mandatory sentencing regimes, the critical facts must be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt,65 but in others the legislature contemplates judicial factfinding using the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
Although the latter procedures may be more efficient and reliable, they have
also spawned important constitutional objections. These objections parallel the
narrowly to apply only to systems in which a parole board determines the actual release date from
prison. “Discretionary sentencing” in this Article corresponds to the broader understanding of
“indeterminate sentencing.” The term encompasses not only traditional unguided sentencing
systems, but also systems with “advisory” (i.e., nonbinding) sentencing guidelines. See Kim S.
Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 FED. SENT’ING RPTR.
233, 233 (2005) (noting that nine states and the District of Columbia employ advisory guidelines).
By contrast, six states and the federal government had “mandatory” sentencing guidelines prior to
the recent Apprendi line of cases. See id. at 239 n.3.
63
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 359 n.2.
64
For a more detailed description of this history and explanation of the trend, see O’Hear, supra
note 16, at 756-91. Presumptive sentencing schemes mandate a particular sentence or narrow
sentencing range, often based on detailed sentencing guidelines that take into account a variety of
offense and offender characteristics; judges must impose the presumptive sentence (or sentence
within the presumptive range) unless particular aggravating or mitigating facts warrant a different
result. Prior to the Apprendi decisions, thirteen states and the federal government employed
presumptive sentencing. Don Stemen & Daniel F. Wilhelm, Finding the Jury: State Legislative
Responses to Blakely v. Washington, 18 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 7, 7 (2005). Presumptive sentencing
schemes (with or without guidelines) may be contrasted with discretionary schemes. See supra
note 62. Note one final distinction: if a legislature wishes to single out a particular type of offense
or offender for special condemnation (in either a discretionary or presumptive system), the
legislature might increase the applicable maximum sentence, in lieu of (or in addition to) increasing
the minimum. Both sorts of increases will be referred to here as “sentence enhancements,”
although their operation differs in at least one important respect: an increased maximum enhances
the scope of the sentencer’s discretion, while an increased minimum diminishes discretion.
65
Bordenkircher., 434 U.S. at 359.
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issues raised by the use of charging threats to induce guilty pleas. On the one
hand, both practices curtail the availability to defendants of basic jury trial
protections in the determination of the facts on which their punishment depends.
On the other hand, judicial regulation of these practices would run counter to
traditional doctrines of deference to coordinate branches of government. At issue
in Bordenkircher was the tradition of judicial deference to prosecutorial charging
decisions. In the sentencing context, the issue was judicial deference to the
legislative determination of crime elements.
The Court confronted these sentencing issues for the first time in 1986 in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania.66 Although Apprendi later repudiated much of
McMillan, the earlier case remains a good starting point for this Part, both
because it illuminates the significance of Apprendi and because, with the same
line-up of Justices as in Goodwin, it also sheds light on the relationship between
the vindictiveness cases and the sentencing cases. (The line-up of Justices is set
forth in Table 1.) After considering McMillan, I summarize the later Apprendi
cases and describe how exactly they are formalist and how consequentialist.
Table 1. Break-Down of Votes in Goodwin, McMillan, and Apprendi
(Current sitting Justices are indicated in bold; M=majority; D=dissent; C=concurrence
in judgment only; N/A=not on Court).
Goodwin
McMillan
Apprendi
M
D
M
Stevens
Burger
M
M
N/A
O’Connor
M
M
D
Powell
M
M
N/A
Rehnquist
M
M
D
White
M
M
N/A
Blackmun
C
D
N/A
Brennan
D
D
N/A
Marshall
D
D
N/A
N/A
N/A
M
Ginsburg
N/A
N/A
M
Scalia
N/A
N/A
M
Souter
N/A
N/A
M
Thomas
N/A
N/A
D
Breyer
N/A
N/A
D
Kennedy

66
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A. McMillan: Taking the Powell Approach Again
In 1982, Pennsylvania adopted its Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act,
which provided that anyone who committed one of a list of serious felonies
would be subject to a mandatory minimum prison sentence of five years if the
sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person
“visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense.”67 Dynel
McMillan and other defendants challenged the Act’s constitutionality, arguing
that it violated the requirement that all elements of a crime be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt,68 as mandated by In re Winship.69 These claims were
ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court.70
Decided just four years after Goodwin by a Court that was comprised of the
same nine justices, it should not be surprising that McMillan reflected a similar
jurisprudential dynamic as the earlier case. Indeed, each of the five members of
the McMillan majority was also part of the Goodwin majority, while both of the
Goodwin dissenters also dissented in McMillan. Thus, only two justices
“switched” in McMillan, and one of those (Blackmun) made just the small step
from a concurrence in judgment to outright dissent. That leaves just one justice
(Stevens) making a sharp break in alignment from Goodwin to McMillan.
Fortunately, Stevens authored a lengthy dissent in the later case, which offers
some clues as to why he “flipped.”
First, however, consider Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion. Powell joined
the opinion without comment, and it does indeed echo major themes from both
his Bordenkircher dissent and the Goodwin majority opinion. Much as the
earlier opinions emphasized judicial deference towards prosecutors, McMillan
emphasized deference towards state legislatures.71 But just as the earlier
opinions declined to make deference absolute, McMillan also indicated “there are
constitutional limits to the State’s power in this regard.”72 McMillan sought a
middle ground—just like Powell in Bordenkircher—between rejecting judicial
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Id. at 81.
Id. at 82-83.
69
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
70
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82.
71
The Court put it this way: “[I]n determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt the state legislature’s definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive . . . .
[W]e should not lightly construe the Constitution so as intrude upon the administration of justice by
the individual States.” Id. at 85.
72
Id. at 86.
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review altogether and imposing rigid, formal constraints that might unduly
burden state crime-control efforts.
The Court thus declined to articulate a “bright line test,”73 but, instead,
identified several potentially relevant considerations. Most notably, the Court
suggested the tail-wagging-the-dog test, asking whether the sentencing factor
(here, visible possession of a firearm) really dominated the sentencing calculus.74
For instance, as to the Pennsylvania Act, because the predicate felonies all
involved maximum sentences in excess of five years, the Act’s new five-year
mandatory minimum did not amount to a tail wagging a dog: the Act “operates
solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting a penalty already
available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm.”75
This McMillan test was reminiscent of Powell’s proposed test in Bordenkircher,
which could be recast in similar terms: Was the state’s effort to induce a guilty
plea (the tail) “wagging” the state’s legitimate interest in punishment (the dog)?
With the majority opinion echoing the earlier Powell dissent, Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall reprised their dissenting position from Bordenkircher.
Marshall, writing for the three, rejected the majority’s approach as overly
deferential and basically endorsed the bright-line test proposed by Stevens.76
Stevens, in his dissent, likewise rejected unlimited deference to the
legislature. “It would demean the importance of the reasonable-doubt standard,”
he wrote, “if the substance of the standard could be avoided by nothing more
than a legislative declaration that prohibited conduct is not an ‘element’ of a
crime.”77 Fair enough, but no one in McMillan was advocating absolute
deference. The real question was the test to be used when a defendant asserted
that a legislature had gone too far. Stevens proposed the following: “[I]f a State
provides that a specific component of a prohibited transaction shall give rise to a
special stigma and a special punishment, that component must be treated as a
‘fact necessary to constitute the crime’ within the meaning of our holding in
Winship.”78 And Stevens had little difficulty concluding that the Pennsylvania
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Id. at 91.
See id. at 88 (“The statute gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the visible
possession finding to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”).
75
Id.
76
Id. at 93-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall declined to join Stevens’ opinion because he was
not ready to commit to Stevens’ approach to mitigating facts. Id at 94.
77
Id. at 102 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78
Id. at 103.
74

19

RECONSIDERING BORDENKIRCHER

statute did, indeed, impose “special stigma” and “special punishment” based on
the “specific component” of visible possession.79
Stevens’s approach might be criticized as not merely insufficiently
deferential to the state legislature, but also futile. The problem lay in his per se
distinction between aggravating and mitigating facts: while aggravating facts
would always have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, no such standard
applied to the disproof of mitigating.80 The rule invited legislative evasion: a
state that was intent on minimizing prosecutorial burdens might simply convert
aggravating factors into mitigating. Stevens himself offered as an example
a statute making presence in any private or public place a felony
punishable by up to five years imprisonment and yet allowing an
affirmative defense for the defendant to prove, to a preponderance of the
evidence, that he was not robbing a bank.81
This hypothetical echoed the prosecutorial evasion scenario that so troubled the
Court in Bordenkircher and Goodwin (i.e., adopting an aggressive high-to-low
charging strategy).
Stevens dismissed the evasion possibilities in this context, however, as
unlikely in a democratic system. “No democratically elected legislature would
enact [the hypothetical] law, and if it did, a broad-based coalition of bankers and
bank customers would soon see the legislation repealed.”82
The
aggravating/mitigating distinction was thus explained by reference to the view
that “constitutional law appropriately exists for those situations where
representative government cannot be trusted, not those where we know it can.”83
B. The Apprendi Canon: Stevens’s Triumph
Beginning with Jones v. United States84 in 1999, a majority of the Court
signaled first its doubts about, and then its rejection of, the approach taken in
McMillan. Five cases constitute what we may think of as the “Apprendi canon”:
Jones, Apprendi, Ring v. Arizona,85 Blakely v. Washington,86 and United States v.
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Id. at 99.
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McMillan, 477 U.S. at 101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Booker.87 In these cases—all but one vigorously contested 5-4 decisions—the
Court adopted and extended the rule proposed by Justice Stevens in his McMillan
dissent. Indeed, Stevens himself authored the majority opinions in Apprendi and
Booker. He was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas.
Technically, Jones presented a question of statutory, not constitutional,
interpretation. The federal carjacking statute at issue in the case provided a
standard 15-year maximum sentence, but an enhanced 25-year maximum
sentence if there had been “serious bodily injury.”88 The Court determined that
this “serious bodily injury” prong of the statute should be regarded as an element
of a separate, aggravated carjacking offense—thus triggering rights to jury factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt—rather than merely an additional factor for
the judge to find at sentencing.89 The Court reached this interpretation, in part,
because a contrary result would raise “grave and doubtful constitutional
questions,” specifically, by increasing the defendant’s sentencing exposure on the
basis of a fact not proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.90 As the
dissenters recognized, the majority here embraced a more robust conception of
jury-trial rights than had been apparent in the Court’s recent jurisprudence.91
What was merely suggested as a constitutional question in Jones became a
constitutional holding the following year in Apprendi. Charles C. Apprendi, Jr.,
pled guilty in New Jersey state court to three weapons violations.92 At
sentencing, the judge determined that Apprendi had acted with a racially biased
purpose, which, under the state hate crimes statute, increased the maximum
possible sentence from twenty to thirty years.93 In ruling that this process had
violated Apprendi’s constitutional rights, the Court limited the McMillan wagthe-dog analysis to sentence enhancements at the bottom end of the sentencing
range, i.e., fact-finding that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence.94 As to
enhancements at the top end of the range, the Court adopted this bright-line rule:
“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”95 The Court thus held that New Jersey’s
87
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sentence enhancement procedure was “an unacceptable departure from the jury
tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system.”96
In Ring, the Court extended Apprendi to capital punishment, overturning a
sentencing scheme in which a judge found the aggravating factors required to
make a murder defendant eligible for death.97 The Court saw no good reason to
distinguish Apprendi; if the jury-trial right encompassed the fact-finding
necessary to increase a defendant’s sentencing exposure by ten years, then it
must also encompass the fact-finding necessary to impose the death penalty.98
In Blakely, the Court considered Apprendi’s applicability to sentencing
guidelines.99 Sentencing guidelines prescribe a narrow sentencing range, within
a broader statutory range, based on the presence or absence of specified factors.
For instance, when Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr., pled guilty in Washington state
court to second-degree kidnapping, he faced a broad statutory range of zero to ten
years.100 Pursuant to state sentencing guidelines, however, Blakely’s offense
triggered a “standard range” of 49 to 53 months,101 with the possibility of an
above-range sentence if the judge found “substantial and compelling reasons
justifying an exceptional sentence.”102 The judge made such a finding on the
basis of his determination that Blakely acted with “deliberate cruelty,” and
imposed a sentence of 90 months103—well above the high end of the standard
range, but still well below the ten-year statutory maximum.
The Court nonetheless held that this process violated Apprendi, refining the
Apprendi rule as follows: “When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s
verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law
makes essential to the punishment, and the judge exceeds his proper
authority.”104 Thus, because the judge in Blakely had imposed a sentence that
would not have been legally permissible absent his finding of deliberate cruelty,
the judge had violated the defendant’s right to a jury trial.105
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In overturning Washington’s sentencing regime, Blakely also cast into doubt
the mandatory guidelines systems employed in a number of other jurisdictions,
including, perhaps most importantly, the federal sentencing guidelines. In United
States v. Booker, the Court finally addressed the federal system, and held that it,
too, ran afoul of the Apprendi rule to the extent that it relied on judicial factfinding.106 Notably, however, the Apprendi Five fractured over the remedy for
this constitutional violation. Four of the five would have retained the mandatory
character of the federal guidelines but required jury fact-finding for sentence
enhancements.107 Ginsburg switched sides, though, to create a separate majority
in favor of a different remedy: conversion of the guidelines from mandatory to
advisory.108 Booker thus boasted two majority opinions, the “merits opinion”
(joined by all members of the Apprendi Five) and the “remedy opinion”
(authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Ginsburg and the merits dissenters).
The Booker remedy has not been the only occasion on which the Five have
parted company. Of greatest significance, Scalia joined the Apprendi dissenters
in Harris v. United States to exempt mandatory minimums from the Apprendi
rule.109 Thus, a judge may still find the facts necessary to trigger a mandatory
minimum (as long as the minimum does not exceed the otherwise applicable
maximum). In effect, then, the Apprendi rule deals just with the defendant’s
worst-case scenario: the rule is violated only if a judge’s fact-finding results in an
increase in the maximum sentence that may be imposed.
C. Apprendi’s Aims
In order to appreciate the inconsistencies between Bordenkircher and the
Apprendi cases, we should begin by considering what exactly the Apprendi Five
said they were up to: what vision purports to animate the extraordinary doctrinal
changes they have embraced? (To be sure, critics contend that the Five cannot
106
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really be serious about the vision they have articulated because there is a
seemingly wide disconnect between that vision and the reality of the Apprendi
rule they adopted. I will address this criticism in the next Section.)
The Apprendi decisions represent a self-conscious choice in favor of the
“common-law ideal” of jury trial over the “civil-law ideal of administrative
perfection.”110 The decisions thus rejected a model of bureaucratized criminal
justice, embodied by judicially administered sentencing guidelines, despite the
model’s conceded advantages of efficiency and consistency.111 In lieu of these
values, the Apprendi Five prioritized the following: (1) democratic control over
the criminal justice system, (2) libertarian checks on state power, and (3) fairness
to defendants.112 Let us consider each of these values in turn.
1. Democratic Control
The Apprendi cases linked the jury to democratic values: “Just as suffrage
ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches,
jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”113 At the same time, it
might seem a bit odd for an (unelected) Supreme Court to strike down a host of
legislatively adopted sentencing schemes in the name of democratic values. Why
not permit a politically accountable legislature to employ the most efficient
means (i.e., judicial fact-finding) to implement its choices about how much
weight to give to particular sentencing factors?
The Apprendi decisions suggest two responses. First, legislative decisions
regarding sentencing factors are necessarily somewhat crude; a legislature cannot
hope to design a sentencing system that takes into account all of the complexity
of the real world. As a result, the literal application of any sentencing rule will
inevitably produce some unduly harsh outcomes that are not truly consistent with
public preferences. Moreover, this disconnect between global legislative
judgments and case-specific community preferences is likely exacerbated by the
110
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tendency, demonstrated in the social science literature, for people to make
harsher judgments about crime in the abstract than when confronted with the
facts of a particular case.114 Preserving a role for the jury at sentencing thus
offers a second level of democratic control that may mitigate the structural
weaknesses of the first. Indeed, both Jones and Apprendi made note of the
common-law tradition of “pious perjury,” whereby a jury might circumvent a
harsh mandatory penalty that seemed disproportionate to the gravity of the
offense.115 In a similar vein, a modern sentencing jury might decline to find an
aggravating sentencing factor that was literally present in a case, but that would
result in a sentence enhancement that, in the jury’s view, was unjust.116
Second, a sentencing jury might also advance democratic values in cases in
which the legislature has structured a sentencing factor in a manner that requires
a discretionary exercise of judgment. Sentence enhancements are sometimes
structured as bright-line rules; think, for instance, of the mandatory minimum in
McMillan that was triggered by the visible possession of a firearm. But
sometimes legislatures employ more open-ended standards; think here of the
system overturned in Blakely, in which the sentence might be enhanced if the
judge found “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional
sentence.” An enhancement of this nature effectively delegates considerable
discretionary authority to the sentencer. In such circumstances, where the
legislature has left much undecided, we might find it particularly important that
implementation of the standard include the participation of another actor with
114
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democratic legitimacy. And, as Jones pointed out, the common-law tradition is
that the jury is not merely a finder of facts, but also an applier of law to facts.117
Thus, the Apprendi decisions do not necessarily contemplate that the jury’s role
in sentencing will be limited to fact-finding, in the narrowest sense of the term,
but may also extend to determining the applicability of more subjectively-defined
sentence enhancements.118 On this view, Apprendi advances democratic values
by channeling the discretionary authority that is subtly embedded in mandatory
sentencing regimes away from judges and towards juries.
Note the complementary nature of these two considerations. The more
particularized and rule-like the sentencing regime, the greater will be the need for
an equitable mechanism, like the jury’s “pious perjury,” in order to address
unanticipated instances of undue severity. As the sentencing regime grows more
flexible and standard-like, the need for this form of law-correction will diminish,
but, with an increase in the sentencer’s discretionary authority, concerns may
grow as to the sentencer’s democratic legitimacy. Either way, the jury may have
a useful role to play alongside the legislature in helping to ensure that sentencing
outcomes conform to public preferences.119

117

Jones, 526 U.S. at 247.
See Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 89, 92 (2004)
(discussing uncertainty as to whether determinations involving “value judgments,” not just findings
of historical fact, trigger jury trial right under Blakely). For an argument that juries are better suited
than judges to determine blameworthiness for sentencing purposes, see Robinson & Spellman,
supra note 112, at 1146-47.
119
In addition to the reasons suggested by the Apprendi decisions, there is at least one other reason
to regard the sentencing jury as an institution that might further democratic values: the jury brings
to bear local views, as against the preferences of a distant legislature that may represent a host of
communities with quite different views. The federal system offers particularly dramatic
illustrations of the potential disconnects between the criminal justice preferences of a local
community and a more encompassing polity, see, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, National
Uniformity/Local Uniformity, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 731 (2002) (“Perhaps most striking are the
federal death penalty cases in states that do not authorize capital punishment.”), but the same issue
can also arise at the state level, see, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57
VAND L. REV. 783, 860-61 (2004) (discussing wide variations in county-level support for
California’s Proposition 36, which requires diversion of drug offenders from incarceration to
treatment). For an argument that local preferences should generally prevail, at least with respect to
crime that occurs on a local scale, see Michael M. O’Hear, Localization and Transparency in
Sentencing: Reflections on the New Early Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 358, 360-63
(2004). More controversially, localization through the jury may also provide a vehicle for
predominantly African-American communities to address racial disparities in the operation of the
criminal justice system. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L. J. 677, 679 (1995). For a leading critique of Professor
118
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2. Containing State Power
The Apprendi decisions repeatedly claimed to protect individual liberty and
contain state power.120 How so? One possibility, of course, is that democratic
control works to restrict state power. That would imply, in the present context, a
tendency for juries to sentence more leniently than judges, thereby diminishing
the coercive power of the state. Ring, for instance, suggested that defendants
might prefer sentencing juries to “less sympathetic” judges.121 This is
doubtlessly true in some cases, but democratic control does not guarantee
generous outcomes. Indeed, some empirical studies suggest that jury sentencing
is often harsher than judicial sentencing.122 Thus, enhanced democratic control,
in and of itself, would not seem the most effective way to limit state power.123
But jury sentencing may serve to contain state power in another respect: as a
sort of procedural tax on prosecutions, that is, a burden on limited state law
enforcement resources that might diminish the number and intensity of
prosecutions and give defendants greater leverage in plea negotiations. Jury
sentencing might be implemented in one of two ways, either as a proceeding that
is distinct from and subsequent to the determination of guilt, or as a connected
adjunct to the basic criminal trial. If implemented through the former
Butler’s proposal, see Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification, 44
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 109 (1996).
Even if one does not accept the view that juries are an effective medium for expressing public
preferences, providing a more robust role for the jury may nonetheless serve the parallel end of
enhancing public perception of democratic control. Robinson & Spellman, supra note 112, at
1148. In other circumstances, the Court has recognized the importance of such perceptions. See,
e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (“[W]e spoke in Buckley of
the perception of corruption inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions, as a
source of concern almost equal to quid pro quo improbity.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
120
See, e.g., Jones, 526 U.S. at 246 (referring to jury as “the grand bulwark” of liberty); Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 477 (characterizing purpose of right to jury trial as “guard[ing] against a spirit of
oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers”); Ring, 536 U.S. at 607 (“The founders of the
American republic were not prepared to leave [criminal justice] to the State, which is why the jurytrial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been
efficient; but it has always been free.”).
121
Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
122
See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study,
57 VAND. L. REV. 883, 898 (2004) (discussing jury sentencing in Kentucky).
123
The goal of limiting state power is easier to square with a jury sentencing right to the extent that
defendants can unilaterally choose the finder of fact, selecting judge or jury according to which is
expected to be more sympathetic. Some jurisdictions, however, require jury-trial waivers from
both defendant and prosecutor. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-36 (1965) (upholding
constitutionality of federal rule to this effect).
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mechanism, the procedural costs (relative to judicial sentencing) are obvious: a
jury must be assembled,124 managed, instructed, and argued to, all with the
enhanced formality that is attendant to jury, as opposed to bench, trials.125 If jury
sentencing is simply folded into the trial on the merits, the whole process will be
far more efficient, but this may not be appealing or practically feasible in a
complex sentencing guidelines system, where sentencing may require factfinding on a dozen or more discrete factors beyond the elements of the offense.126
Moreover, even if this latter approach is selected, there is still the problem of
guilty plea cases, in which the Apprendi decisions may necessitate the
impaneling of a sentencing jury where no jury would otherwise be required.127
The procedural tax theory squares with how the Apprendi decisions
described what they were doing. There can be no question but that the decisions
self-consciously rejected efficiency in favor of limited state power. As Ring put
it, “[The jury-trial guarantee] has never been efficient; but it has always been
free.”128 The procedural tax theory would go just one step further: “Because the
jury trial has never been efficient, it has always been free.”
The procedural tax theory also squares with the Court’s pairing of the jurytrial right with the right to fact-finding beyond a reasonable doubt, which also
protects individual liberty by imposing increased procedural burdens on
prosecutors. The rule in Apprendi, for instance, expressly linked the two rights:
“[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory

124

In cases in which the defendant was convicted by a jury, the same jury might be reconvened for
sentencing, which would save the not inconsiderable costs associated with jury selection. Most
cases, however, are resolved by guity plea; in such cases, jury sentencing might necessitate the
selection of a jury that otherwise would not have been required.
125
See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (detailing reasons jury trial entails “far
more prosecutorial work” than bench trial); Turner, supra note 114, at 109 (discussing procedural
formalities that might have to be observed in sentencing proceedings under Blakely). These costs
may vary by jurisdiction, though, depending on how complex the jurisdiction’s sentencing scheme
is and how the jury-trial rights are implemented. See id. at 110 (noting relatively low costs of
implementing Apprendi in Kansas).
126
See Turner, supra note 114, at 108 (arguing that, “in many cases, bifurcation is indispensable to
ensuring a fair trial” and noting that Kansas, when “Blakely-izing” its sentencing guidelines, “let
judges determine on a case-by-case basis when bifurcation would be in the interest of justice”).
127
To be sure, a plea agreement might include a waiver of jury rights as to sentencing; however, not
all guilty pleas are rendered pursuant to an agreement, and (depending on the priorities and relative
bargaining leverage of the parties) not all agreements need necessarily include a waiver of such
rights. But see id. at 110 (noting “double-waiver” requirement in some jurisdictions, which
requires that sentencing jury right be waived if trial jury right is waived).
128
536 U.S. at 607.

28

RECONSIDERING BORDENKIRCHER

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”129
3. Fairness to Defendants
Finally, the Apprendi decisions also purport to enhance fairness to
defendants. Fairness, here, is used in the sense suggested by some BLE scholars:
consistency of outcomes with even imperfectly rational expectations.130 Fairness
to defendants would thus imply that there are no nasty surprises at the end of the
sentencing process; to the extent that the system fosters sentencing expectations,
the system should not disappoint those expectations. Blakely, in particular,
emphasized these considerations:
Any evaluation of Apprendi’s “fairness” to criminal defendants must
compare it with the regime it replaced, in which a defendant, with no
warning in either his indictment or plea, would routinely see his
maximum potential sentence balloon from as little as five years to as
much as life imprisonment, based not on facts proved to his peers beyond
a reasonable doubt, but on facts extracted after trial from a report
compiled by a probation officer who the judge thinks more likely got it
right than wrong.131
The Apprendi decisions are thus presented as an effort to save defendants from
nasty surprises delivered “without warning” at sentencing.
D. Is It Really Just “Doctrinaire Formalism”?
The Apprendi Five may claim that they are advancing democratic,
libertarian, and fairness values, but are they really? Justice O’Connor,
characterizing their handiwork as “doctrinaire formalism,” thinks otherwise.132
Her contention, along with that of the other Apprendi dissenters, is that the
Apprendi rule will be evaded, such that there will be no step forward as to the
basic jury-trial values, but, if anything, a step back. The dissenters have focused
on three potential forms of evasion: (1) legislative inversion of sentence
enhancements (i.e., increasing standard sentences and converting aggravating
factors into mitigating), (2) a return to discretionary sentencing, and (3)
129

530 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added).
Infra Part II.D.2.
131
542 U.S. at 311-12.
132
Id. at 321 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). O’Connor doubtlessly has in mind here the sort of rigid
formalism that dominated American legal thinking a century ago and that was the subject of
relentless attacks by the Legal Realists. See Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of
Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 89-93 (2005).
130
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prosecutorial use of plea inducements to force defendants to surrender their jury
rights at sentencing. (A fourth type of evasion, expanded use of mandatory
minimums, is discussed separately in the Conclusion.133) These evasion
arguments, which mirror analogous concerns raised by the Bordenkircher and
Goodwin majorities, are discussed in turn below. I will show that there are at
least plausible responses to each of these concerns, and that accordingly the
Apprendi decisions cannot fairly be accused of indifference to consequences.
Before reaching the evasion arguments, however, this Section begins with two
prefatory considerations: a description of the real formalism of the Apprendi
decisions and a summary of key principles of BLE that will aid our
understanding of Apprendi’s consequentialism.
1. Apprendi’s Formalism
There is at least one sense in which the Apprendi decisions are unabashedly
formalist: rule structure. Recall that the McMillan test, which was largely
displaced by Apprendi and its progeny, employed a highly indeterminate
standard, i.e., whether the tail (the sentencing factor) was wagging the dog (the
underlying offense). Blakely, in particular, heaped scorn on the test for its
indeterminacy.134 The Apprendi bright-line rule was preferable for the more
robust protection it provided for jury rights; it would be perverse, Blakely
suggested, to adopt a discretionary test that effectively endowed judges with the
authority to decide the scope of their own power relative to juries.135

133

The form of evasion stands on a different footing than the other three because the Apprendi Five
have no unified position on it; four would have closed the “loophole” in Harris, while Justice
Scalia (without explanation) provided the key fifth vote to keep it open. Supra Part II.B. Thus,
discussion of this form of evasion would not contribute much to the immediate objective of teasing
out the shared values and assumptions of the Five.
134
542 U.S. at 312 n.13.
135
542 U.S. at 308 (“Whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates this manipulable [McMillan]
standard rather than Apprendi’s bright-line rule depends on the plausibility of the claim that the
Framers would have left definition of the scope of jury power up to judges’ intuitive sense of how
far [in the legislative creation of new sentencing factors] is too far. We think that claim not
plausible at all . . . .”). A few state courts have recently reached the conclusion that Booker
represented an implicit retreat from the bright-line rule of Apprendi and Blakely. See Jonathan D.
Soglin & J. Bradley O’Connell, Blakely, Booker, & Black: Beyond the Bright Line, 18 FED.
SENT’ING RPTR. 46, 46 (discussing decisions by courts in California, Tennessee, and New Mexico).
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear one of these cases, Cunningham v. California, with oral
arguments scheduled in the fall of 2006. Michael M. O’Hear, Cunningham: Why Federal
Practitioners Should Pay Attention, 18 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. __ (2006). While the recent addition
of two new Justices may change the Court’s dynamic on Apprendi issues, a retreat from the bright-
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Adopting a formalist test, however, is not the same thing as “doctrinaire
formalism,” which implies indifference to consequences. Indeed, as Blakely
suggested, one might adopt a bright-line rule specifically in order to produce
more meaningful consequences.136 Underscoring this point, the Apprendi
decisions repeatedly rejected arguments that the constitutional analysis should
turn on statutory labels.137 As O’Connor herself recognized, these rejected tests
were no less “bright-line” than the Apprendi rule.138 What drew the Apprendi
Five to their rule was not merely its formalist character, but also its anticipated
consequences.139
2. Key Principles of Behavioral Law and Economics
A central insight of BLE is that “people evaluate outcomes based on the
change they represent from an initial reference point, rather than based on the
nature of the outcome itself.”140 This basic insight informs four salient,
overlapping principles, each of which has been demonstrated in a host of
empirical studies. First, people tend to be loss-averse, i.e., “they weigh losses
more heavily than gains of equal magnitude.”141 Second, while loss-avoidance
may be preferred to gains, the concepts of “gain” and “loss” are malleable.142
Thus, the framing of a transaction as a gain or a loss may play an important role
in determining whether or not it is viewed as desirable. Third, the starting point
in a transaction tends to condition the outcome, even if the starting point is

line rule approach—which was so ringingly endorsed in Blakely by five Justices who remain on the
Roberts Court—would be surprising.
136
See 542 U.S. at 308 (rejecting indeterminate standard as unlikely to prevent erosion of jury’s
power).
137
See, e.g., Apprendi¸ 530 U.S. at 494 (“The relevant inquiry is not one of form, but of effect . . .
.”); Ring, 536 U.S. at 604 (“If Arizona prevailed on its . . . argument, Apprendi would be reduced to
a meaningless and formalistic rule of statutory drafting.”).
138
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 321 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
139
To be sure, the Apprendi decisions might be defended on the basis of other formalist values. See
King & Klein, supra note 15, at 1485 (arguing that Apprendi “maintains fidelity to historical
practice and prior decisions”). But see Bibas, supra note 15, at 196 (arguing that relevant history is
unclear). The point here is not that the Apprendi decisions would have come out differently if the
Five had been oblivious to consequences, but, rather, that the decisions do plausibly purport to
attend to consequences. Indeed, despite frequent citations in the decisions to historical sources, I
think Professor Bibas has it right when he argues that originalism was not the “driving force”
behind the decisions. Id. at 201.
140
Jolls, et al., supra note 17, at 1535.
141
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2508
(2004).
142
Id. at 2512.
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random or irrelevant.143 An initial reference effectively becomes an anchor, and
“people usually do not adjust away from their anchors enough.”144 Thus, for
instance, one study shows that “the asking price of a house strongly influences
appraisals of its value, even for experts who consider the asking price completely
uninformative and who have plenty of other information.”145
Fourth, the losses that people try to avoid include not only material losses,
but also losses to reputation and self-image.146
As a result of these
considerations, human behavior often conforms to the principle of reciprocal
fairness: people are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to help
those who are acting fairly, but are also willing to sacrifice so as to punish those
who are acting unfairly.147 (Fairness, as suggested above, can be understood by
reference to deviations from expectations; for instance, consumers will perceive
as unfair a firm that takes advantage of the short-term scarcity of a good by
increasing established prices.148) People, in other words, like to have a reputation
for, and a self-image of, decency; but they also seek to avoid the appearance of
being a dupe or a doormat.149 These tendencies can be observed empirically in
experimental variations on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma.150
3. The Evasion Arguments
Having now identified some of the ways in which actual human behavior
might differ from the model of homo economicus, let us consider how these
principles might inform the debate over Apprendi’s consequentialism. This
debate largely revolves around three potential strategies for evading Apprendi.
a. Legislative Inversion
As Justice O’Connor observed, the Apprendi rule could, in principle, be
defeated by a seemingly straightforward legislative reform: standard penalties
could be increased, with maximum sentences then reduced based on the absence

143

Id. at 2515.
Id. at 2516.
145
Id. (citing Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An
Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84 (1987))
146
Jolls et al., supra note 17, at 1494.
147
Id. at 1494 (citing Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics,
83 AM. ECON. REV.1281 (1993).
148
Id. at 1511-12.
149
Id. at 1495.
150
Id. at 1494.
144
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of specified aggravating circumstances.151 In this inversion process, sentence
“aggravators” would effectively be converted into “mitigators,” but, at least in
principle, the same sentencing outcomes should be obtained—and without a need
ever to impanel a sentencing jury. (Recall that the Apprendi rule only requires a
jury when the maximum sentence is increased beyond the standard range for the
offense.) If legislatures were, in fact, to respond to Apprendi by systematically
inverting their sentencing regimes, then O’Connor’s charge of doctrinaire
formalism might have some appeal: the inverted regimes, still relying on judicial
fact-finding, would do nothing to advance Apprendi’s purported objectives of
democratic control and limited state power.152
In Apprendi, however, Justice Stevens repeated the response he made to this
argument in McMillan, characterizing the likelihood of inversion as “remote.”153
He relied on “democratic constraints” that would “discourage legislatures from
enacting penal statutes that exposed every defendant convicted of, for example,
weapons possession, to a maximum sentence exceeding that which is, in the
legislature’s judgment, generally proportional to the crime.”154 Stevens, in other
words, doubted that politically sensitive legislators operating in the real world
would actually do as the dissenters predicted.155
Why should this be so? Why would voters find any more objectionable a
high-to-low than a low-to-high sentencing scheme? To use the facts of Apprendi
itself as an example, why would voters support a ten-year maximum for a simple
firearms possession offense with a possible additional ten years if there were
racial bias, but oppose a standard twenty-year maximum for the firearms offense
with a reduction to ten years in the absence of racial bias? In principle, the
151

O’Connor put it this way in Apprendi:
New Jersey could cure its sentencing scheme, and achieve virtually the same results, by
drafting its weapons possession statute in the following manner: First, New Jersey could
prescribe, in the weapon possession statute itself, a range of 5 to 20 years’ imprisonment
for one who commits that criminal offense. Second, New Jersey could provide that a
defendant convicted under the statute whom a judge finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, not to have acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual on the basis of race
may receive a sentence no greater than 10 years’ imprisonment.
530 U.S. at 541-42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
152
On the other hand, inversion might advance the third objective, fairness to defendants, inasmuch
as an increase in the standard maximum sentence might diminish the likelihood of defendants
receiving a nasty surprise at sentencing.
153
530 U.S. at 466 n.16.
154
Id.
155
In case this were not enough, the Apprendi Court also reserved some “wiggle room” for itself to
deal with inversion through constitutional adjudication. Chanenson, supra note 62, at 415.
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consequences of both laws should be the same.156 Yet, there is something
intuitively plausible in Stevens’s claim that voters will perceive the two laws
quite differently, and, indeed, precisely as Stevens predicted, legislatures have
not rushed to adopt top-down schemes in the wake of Apprendi.157
While not fully articulated, Stevens’s intuition must rest on assumptions of
cognitive bias.158 In order to see why, we first need to consider what it is that
legislators want from sentencing law. In his influential work on the politics of
criminal law, Professor Stuntz has identified two key objectives: (1) ensuring
conviction and punishment of people “who commit the kinds of offenses that
voters fear,” and (2) taking symbolic stands against the latest crime dominating
the headlines159 (the proverbial “offense du jour”). Legislators, however, do not
want indiscriminate across-the-board sentence increases. For one thing, they
must recognize that voters do not necessarily support severe sentences for lowlevel criminals.160 For another, sentence increases cost money, and legislators (at
the state level at least) must be mindful of fiscal pressures.161 Indeed, if
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On the margins, a few cases might come out differently based on the different allocation of the
burden of proof. It seems unlikely, however, that a technical legal difference of this nature would
engender the sort of dramatically different voter response that Stevens contemplated.
157
The states most affected by the Apprendi line of cases have instead either engrafted jury factfinding onto their presumptive sentencing regimes, converted from presumptive to discretionary, or
ignored the problem. Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 64, at 8-9.
158
The “democratic constraints” argument has been subject to much criticism on the ground that,
among other things, it rests on the implausible assumption that voters understand statutory maxima
but not sentence enhancements. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1137 (2001). I offer here an
original defense of Stevens’s hypothesis that does not rest on the assumption that voters have a
patchwork knowledge of how sentencing works, but, rather, on the assumption that voters and
legislators evaluate what they “know” in ways that are shaped by framing and anchoring effects.
159
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICHIGAN L. REV. 505, 53032 (2001).
160
See Vincent Schiraldi & Judith Greene, Reducing Correctional Costs in an Era of Tightening
Budgets and Shifting Public Opinion, 14 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 332, 332-33 (2002) (summarizing
evidence of recent softening in public attitudes towards sentencing and growing interest in
rehabilitative alternatives for nonviolent criminals). In light of recent public corruption
prosecutions, there may also be a measure of self-interest on the part of legislators in avoiding
indiscriminate sentence increases. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Craig S. Lerner,
Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of
Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 603-04 (2004).
161
See Ronald F. Wright, The Power of Bureaucracy in the Response to Blakely and Booker, 43
HOUSTON L. REV. 389, 412-13 (2006) (arguing, based on record of state responses to Blakely and
Booker, that state sentencing commissions can successfully influence legislative reforms with
appeals to fiscal responsibility).
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expenditures on incarcerating low-level criminals are too high, legislators may
compromise their own future capacity to respond to new offenses du jour.
It is the undesirability of indiscriminate sentence increases that makes
inversion so politically unattractive. To be sure, in a world of rational actors, it
would be easy to invert without causing a broad increase in sentence lengths.
But two forms of cognitive bias, framing and anchoring, complicate matters.
First, because aggravators are framed as losses for convicted defendants at
sentencing, while mitigators are framed as benefits, legislators will find it
unappealing to enact a new sentencing scheme that is rich in mitigators but poor
in aggravators; doing so is likely to appear to the public as “soft on crime.”
(What politician would tout her vote for reducing the sentences of criminals who
don’t happen to be racists?) Yet, without the simultaneous conversion of
aggravators to mitigators, a broad increase in standard sentence ranges is likely to
result in increased actual sentence lengths.
Second, research on anchoring effects teaches that starting points can
condition outcomes, even if the starting points are irrelevant or arbitrary. This
suggests that, in practice, simple inversion of a sentencing system (even
assuming full conversion of aggravators to mitigators) will not produce the same
outcomes that were achieved pre-inversion; instead, the newly increased standard
sentence that is triggered by a conviction, even though technically irrelevant to
defendants who qualify for mitigated sentences, will likely push sentences up
across the board. This provides further support for Stevens’s intuition that
legislatures will avoid the inversion option.
b. Discretionary Sentencing
If inversion is politically unappealing, a legislature might instead evade
Apprendi by adopting a discretionary sentencing system. Nothing in the
Apprendi line of decisions casts doubt on the constitutionality of judicial factfinding in connection with the selection of a sentence within a broad range;
indeed, Booker itself makes clear that a discretionary system employing advisory
guidelines with judicial fact-finding is perfectly constitutional.162 Such a switch
would plainly undermine the goal of democratic control, as well as lift the
procedural tax on the exercise of state prosecutorial power.
Responding to this argument, Blakely suggested that the switch to discretion,
like inversion, might prove to be more a theoretical than an actual concern,
162

543 U.S. at 233 (“We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in
imposing a sentence within a statutory range.”).

35

RECONSIDERING BORDENKIRCHER

noting that Kansas, the first state to modify its sentencing system as a result of
Apprendi, had opted for jury fact-finding in lieu of judicial discretion.163 Still,
the possibility that some states might abandon presumptive sentencing schemes
was not dismissed out of hand, as inversion had been. And the fact that the
Booker remedy majority subsequently adopted this very approach for the federal
system suggests that such dismissal would have been mistaken.
But the possibility of greater reliance on discretionary sentencing does not
really undermine Apprendi’s aims as much as might first appear. First, as the
example of Kansas and other states suggest, the contemporary unpopularity of
discretionary sentencing means that many presumptive jurisdictions will likely
choose to remain presumptive (with the addition, of course, of jury factfinding).164 Even if democratic control is not uniformly advanced across the
country, it will be in at least some jurisdictions.165
Second, while a switch to discretion may lift the procedure tax, a system
reformed along these lines may nonetheless offer greater constraints on state
power than a mandatory system. In a discretionary system, the judge may serve
as a meaningful check on prosecutorial overreaching,166 while in a mandatory
system the judge may be reduced to a much less significant “bean-counting”
role.167 Prosecutors can dominate a mandatory system by controlling which
sentence enhancements are sought and which grounds for leniency are supported
or contested.168 While prosecutors certainly do not always use their power to
obtain the longest possible sentence, there are good reasons to believe that
prosecutors, by and large, tend to take a more favorable view of their own cases
163

542 U.S. at 390-10.
Additionally, some states, like Minnesota, have chosen to retain their presumptive systems
because they have come to rely on the ability of presumptive sentencing to predict and control
corrections resource needs. Dale G. Parent & Richard S. Frase, Why Minnesota Will Weather
Blakely’s Blast, 18 FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 12, 17 (2005).
165
In addition to Kansas, at least six more states have recently adopted jury fact-finding for
sentencing purposes in the wake of the Apprendi decisions. Stemen & Wilhelm, supra note 64, at
8. At least two states have switched from mandatory to discretionary, while several others with
mandatory systems that seem to violate Blakely have yet to respond. Id. at 8-9.
166
See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471,
1474 (1993) (“Historically, the prosecutor’s extraordinary bargaining power over defendants was
constrained by independent judicial sentencing.”).
167
See id. at 1475 (“Judicial sentencing no longer limits prosecutorial power in federal courts.”);
Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91
NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1247, 1255 (1997) (“One judge has recently likened his role in
sentencing to that of a ‘notary public’ . . . .”).
168
O’Hear, supra note 16, at 808.
164
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than do judges.169 And, indeed, federal judges, with their newly enhanced
discretion, have been imposing a higher rate of sentences below guidelinesmandated levels than pre-Booker.170
Finally, Blakely argued for the fairness of a discretionary system relative to a
mandatory one.171 Fairness, as BLE scholars suggest, should take into account
baseline expectations, and a discretionary sentencing system will satisfy
expectations insofar as it reliably results in a sentence within the maximum
established by the conviction. As Justice Scalia put it, “I think it not unfair to tell
a prospective felon that if he commits his contemplated crime he is exposing
himself to a jail sentence of 30 years—and that if, upon conviction, he gets
anything less than that he may thank the mercy of a tenderhearted judge.”172 By
contrast, the problem with a mandatory system is that it might, “with no
warning,” result in a dramatically higher sentence than expected on the basis of
the offense of conviction.173
169

See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590-91 (2006) (describing how cognitive bias helps to
explain “the failure of prosecutors always to make just decisions”). There are limits to this line of
reasoning; as Professor Stuntz observes, “[M]ost of the judges are elected by the same voters who
elect district attorneys.” William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2561 (2002). Many judges, moreover, are former prosecutors or
are otherwise philosophically inclined to give prosecutors the benefit of the doubt. At the same
time, it is important to recognize that democratic accountability is often structured quite
differently—and less robustly—for judges than for prosecutors, supra note 116, and judges are
largely protected from the sorts of case-specific cognitive bias described by Professor Burke.
Judges’ separation from the institutional culture of law enforcement may also enhance their ability
to take an appropriately skeptical view of some prosecutions. See GARY T. LOWENTHAL, DOWN
AND DIRTY JUSTICE: A CHILLING JOURNEY INTO THE DARK WORLD OF CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL
COURTS 111 (2003) (describing anti-defendant culture within which prosecutors work).
170
Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43
HOUSTON L. REV. 341, 350 (2006) For a more detailed argument in favor of judicial discretion at
sentencing as a means of protecting individual liberty, see Luna, supra note 132, at 95-100.
171
Supra text accompanying note 131.
172
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
173
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 311-12. The argument here is colorable, but admittedly not compelling on
its face, for it assumes that defendant expectations in a discretionary system will be shaped by the
maximum possible sentence. It is possible, however, that in some cases the “anchor” will be a
much smaller number, for instance, the sentencing prediction of the defendant’s lawyer, the
recommendation made by the prosecutor, or a sentence recently imposed in a similar case. Indeed,
this is almost certain to be the case in a discretionary system with robust advisory guidelines, such
as the post-Booker federal system. If the anchor is low, then a defendant’s expectations may be as
severely disappointed as in a mandatory system. Cf. United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d
189, 197 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that judge need not give advance notice to defendant of intent to
impose sentence above the federal guidelines’ advisory range). Indeed, if a mandatory system
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In sum, while I do not mean to argue that discretionary sentencing is
necessarily better than mandatory, there are at least plausible reasons, taking into
account libertarian and fairness values, to prefer a discretionary system over a
mandatory system that uses judicial fact-finding.174
c. Plea Bargaining
Given the option of discretionary sentencing, legislatures might or might not
choose to give juries a more robust role to play in the sentencing process. To
whatever extent juries were formally made available, however, the Apprendi
dissenters predicted that they would be seldom used: “[T]he greater expense
attached to trials and their greater complexity, taken together in the context of an
overworked criminal justice system, will likely mean, other things being equal,
fewer trials and a greater reliance upon plea-bargaining—a system in which
punishment is set not by judges or juries but by advocates acting under
bargaining constraints.”175 Moreover, not only would Apprendi produce fewer
trials, but, the dissenters argued, the resulting system would be less fair, in the
sense that it would be less uniform. Prosecutors would control the punishment
by deciding which sentencing factors to charge and then bargain away.176 These
prosecutorial processes, however, “lack transparency and too often mean
nonuniform, sometimes arbitrary, sentencing practices.”177
Since at least the time of Bordenkircher, increasing numbers of defendants
have been surrendering their right to a jury trial on the basic issue of guilt or
innocence,178 and there is no reason to doubt the assumption of the Apprendi
dissenters that the right to a jury trial on sentencing factors will be treated any
differently. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Apprendi is a futile
gesture. Again, consider Apprendi’s three aims in turn.
First, while most defendants might trade away their Apprendi rights, that
does not necessarily mean that all will. Moreover, those defendants most likely
operates in a transparent and predictable fashion, it may do an even better job of fulfilling
expectations than a discretionary system. A definitive resolution of the fairness question, then,
depends on a number of uncertain empirical issues.
174
Professor Huigens also defends discretionary systems as better able to achieve “finegrainedness” in sentencing, which is “important for maintaining the moral credibility and public
standing of the criminal justice system.” Kyron Huigens, Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1048, 1069 (2005).
175
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 338 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176
Id.
177
Id. at 345.
178
See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice,
154 U. PENN. L. REV. 79, 91 (2005) (showing long-term guilty plea trends in federal cases).
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to insist on a jury trial will include those who most stubbornly believe that the
application of a particular sentence enhancement sought by a prosecutor would
be unjust. It is precisely in these sorts of cases, in which there are legitimate
disputes surrounding the application of a sentencing factor, that a jury might have
the most to contribute as the voice of the community. It is the hard cases in
which democratic control is the most important in the implementation of
sentencing enhancements, and Apprendi does at least ensure the availability of a
jury in those cases. As Blakely observed, “That more defendants elect to waive
that right [to a jury] (because, for example, government at the moment is not
particularly oppressive) does not prove that a constitutional provision
guaranteeing availability of that option is disserved.”179 The flipside is that when
government does act oppressively, as by seeking morally or legally dubious
sentencing enhancements, the defendant may seek protection from his or her
peers on the jury.
Second, to the extent that defendants do bargain away their Apprendi rights,
the procedural tax will indeed be lifted, but in a manner that is consistent with the
goal of limiting state power, for defendants will likely receive concessions from
prosecutors in the process. “Every new element that a prosecutor can threaten to
charge is also an element that a defendant can threaten to contest at trial and
make the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”180
Finally, we reach the nub of the dissenters’ objection to Apprendi, the
fairness point. A mandatory guidelines system that rests on jury fact-finding will
leave prosecutors with gatekeeping authority over the application of sentencing
enhancements, and prosecutors will not ensure uniform results across cases.181
The Apprendi Five responded, however, that the system of “judicial” sentencing
was plagued by its own uniformity problems: prosecutors had plenty of tools
available to influence the sentence even in the world of judicial fact-finding, as

179

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 312.
Id. at 311. While not all would agree with this proposition, see Bibas, supra note 15, at 198-99,
Professors King and Klein have persuasively argued that the circumstances in which defendants
would be worse off under Apprendi are narrow and unusual. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REV. 295, 306-07 (2001).
181
Note that the same uniformity concerns might be raised as to discretionary sentencing systems.
It is important, however, to recall that discretionary sentencing can be implemented in a variety of
ways other than through the traditional system of completely unguided discretion. Such alternative
approaches may, in fact, be effective in achieving uniformity goals. See Hunt & Connelly, supra
note 62, at 235 (discussing higher compliance rates with advisory guidelines in some states than
with presumptive guidelines in other states).
180
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by making sentencing recommendations.182 Such tools could easily be used as
bargaining chips, thereby creating the same sorts of problems of prosecutorcreated disparity that the dissenters feared would arise post-Apprendi.183
More fundamentally, though, there was the issue of perceived unfairness
discussed above: in the world of judicial fact-finding, “a defendant, with no
warning in either his indictment or plea, would routinely see his maximum
potential sentence balloon from as little as five years to as much as life
imprisonment.”184 Note the very different views of what constitutes fairness
from the perspective of the dissenters (whose objective is the “systematic
fairness” of consistent results across the run of cases185) and the majority (who
concentrate on the perceptions of individual defendant in light of the expectations
established by earlier proceedings in their own cases). Seen through the latter
lens, the Apprendi canon can indeed be viewed as providing a fairness benefit to
defendants, even in the absence of a greater number of jury trials.
d. Summary
The Apprendi Five repeatedly rejected the charge of doctrinaire formalism
and instead asserted that they were advancing democratic, libertarian, and
fairness values in a meaningful way. One does not have to agree fully with all of
their contentions to acknowledge that they could, in good faith, lay claim the
consequentialist high ground. In any event, what is important for present
purposes is not whether the Five ultimately had the better of the argument with
the dissenters, but what the Five should think of Bordenkircher, assuming that
they really meant what they said in the Apprendi decisions.
The Five expected that their decisions would cause some jurisdictions to
enhance judicial discretion and others to create a formal role for juries in the
sentencing process. Their alignment in the Booker remedy opinions suggests that
one of the Five (Justice Ginsburg) preferred the discretion option, while the other
four preferred the jury option. In any event, they plainly viewed both options as
182

542 U.S. at 311.
This is one among several reasons why I have argued that the dissenters greatly overstated the
uniformity in federal sentencing prior to Booker. Michael M. O’Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17
FED. SENT’ING RPTR. 249 (2005).
184
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 311.
185
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 339 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Interestingly, while the dissenters framed the
uniformity issue as one of abstract, system-wide fairness, they might have reframed the issue in
ways that were more in line with the majority’s subjective understanding of fairness: sentencing
reformers in the 1970’s and 1980’s frequently argued that sentencing disparities were a source of
great unhappiness among prisoners. O’Hear, supra note 16, at 760, 772-73.
183
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constitutionally acceptable and preferable to the pre-Apprendi world of sentence
enhancements triggered by judicial fact-finding.
Finally, Apprendi’s consequentialism seems influenced by the view that (as
BLE scholars put it) “people evaluate outcomes based on the change they
represent from an initial reference point, rather than based on the nature of the
outcome itself.”186 This insight helps to explain Apprendi’s dismissal of the
inversion argument, as well as the contrasting definitions of fairness employed by
the majority and dissenters. For this reason, we might usefully think about
Apprendi’s consequentialism as “biased-actor” consequentialism, differentiating
it from a “rational-actor” consequentialism that predicts and evaluates
consequences on the traditional homo economicus model, in which people think
about outcomes without regard to the path by which the outcomes are reached.
III. INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN APPRENDI AND BORDENKIRCHER
This Part elaborates on the inconsistencies between the Apprendi decisions
and Bordenkircher. These inconsistencies have two dimensions: (1) the relative
value ascribed to bureaucratic efficiency in the criminal justice system, and (2)
the use of rational-actor assumptions.
A. Common Law Values Versus Bureaucratic Efficiency
The Apprendi decisions were not framed as narrowly addressed to technical
questions of law, but rather purported to select one “paradigm of criminal
justice” over another: “the common-law ideal of limited state power” over “the
civil-law ideal of administrative perfection,”187 the “common-sense judgment” of
the jury over the “more tutored” judgment of the legal professionals.188
Bordenkircher also reflected an underlying choice of paradigms, but the
paradigm chosen was the one that lost in the Apprendi cases. The Bordenkircher
Court concluded that guilty pleas were an “important[] component of this
country’s criminal justice system”189; characterized its prior decisions as not
merely tolerating, but “encouraging,” the inducement of pleas190; and indicated
that its “acceptance of the basic legitimacy” of the practice necessitated
deference to the prosecutor’s choice of tactics.191 Bordenkircher’s vision of
unconstrained plea-inducement is profoundly at odds with Apprendi’s paradigm.
186

Jolls, et al., supra note 17, at 1535.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313.
188
Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
189
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362 (citation omitted).
190
Id. at 364.
191
Id. at 363-64.
187
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It is a system dominated by legal professionals, with no room for the “commonsense judgment” of jurors. While the system may boast considerable speed and
efficiency, the Apprendi decisions repeatedly rejected the centrality of these
virtues.192
To be sure, the Apprendi Five did not anticipate that their decisions would
turn back the clock to a time when jury trials were the norm in the criminal
justice system.193 But they suggested that, even in the absence of common-law
practices, the Constitution should be interpreted so as to safeguard common-law
values, most notably, the value of maintaining a robust check on the ability of
prosecutors to impose disproportionate punishments on an arbitrary or vindictive
basis. The repeated reference in the Apprendi decisions to the common-law
tradition of pious perjury is telling.
Heavy-handed charging threats, a la Bordenkircher, embody contempt for the
common-law values of checks and balances in the criminal justice system. They
send defendants a message that only the prosecutor’s view of the case counts, and
that the system accords little actual value to their formal rights to be heard.194
Moreover, the inconsistencies between Apprendi and Bordenkircher go beyond
such symbolic considerations.195 If prosecutors have a free hand to raise the
192

See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 607 (“It has never been efficient; but it has always been free.”). As
the Apprendi decisions suggest, efficiency did not become a central preoccupation of the criminal
justice until well after the framing of the Sixth Amendment. See Nancy Jean King, Priceless
Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 113, 121-23 (1999)
(describing emergence of efficiency concerns in late 1800’s and early 1900’s).
193
See King, supra note 192, at 119-20 (“Courts of the nineteenth century would have ridiculed the
idea that an accused and a prosecutor could dicker over what kind of break the defendant deserves
for waiving a piece of the criminal process.”).
194
Professors Scott and Stuntz have a wonderful analogy for Bordenkircher that nicely captures
this aspect of the prosecutor’s actions:
The . . . analogy is . . . the lone gas station in the middle of the desert that charges fifty
dollars for a gallon of gas. Like the prosecutor in Bordenkircher, the gas station usually
gets its asking price, because the difference between that price and the cost of going
without (death in the desert) is so high. . . . Imagine, however, that the gas station owner
goes further. Figuring that the buyer will kick and scream and haggle for an hour, but
will eventually agree to the seller’s price, the seller decides to cut the negotiation short by
letting the air out of the buyer’s tires and offering to refill the tires if, but only if, the
buyer pays the seller’s asking price for gas.
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 1964.
195
As a growing body of social psychology research suggests, however, symbolism itself can play
an important role in the ability of the criminal justice system to achieve its objective of enhancing
public compliance with the mandates of the law and legal institutions. See, e.g., Larry Heuer,
What’s Just About the Criminal Justice System? A Psychological Perspective, 13 J. L. & POL’Y
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stakes in a jury trial as high as they wish, then only the most impetuous
defendants will dare to invoke the protection from government overreaching that
is potentially afforded by a jury. The availability of the jury is thereby
effectively curtailed. And those who dare resist the pressure, like Paul Hayes,
may pay an extraordinary price for doing so. Ironically, those who ask a jury to
determine whether the government is overreaching may thereby assure that they
become victims of overreaching.
One response to all of this, of course, is that, however troubling charging
threats might be, it is futile to regulate them. Prosecutors will simply file more
aggressive initial charges, switching from “threats” to “offers,” with equally
coercive effects. This argument, analogous to the inversion argument made by
the Apprendi dissenters, is considered in the next Section.
B. Biased Actors Versus Rational Actors
Bordenkircher’s consequentialism parallels that of the Apprendi dissenters.
This becomes most apparent by reconsidering a portion of Justice Blackmun’s
dissent in Bordenkircher, specifically, his response to the majority’s view that
regulating the low-to-high strategy would merely cause prosecutors to switch to
the seemingly equivalent high-to-low approach. Blackmun identified three
reasons why high-to-low was actually preferable to low-to-high. These three
reasons resonate with the thinking behind the Apprendi decisions and indicate
why the Apprendi Five should find Bordenkircher’s analysis unpersuasive.
First, Blackmun argued, under the high-to-low approach,
the prosecutor is required to reach a charging decision without any
knowledge of the particular defendant’s willingness to plead guilty;
hence the defendant who truly believes himself to be innocent, and
wishes for that reason to go to trial, is not likely to be subject to quite
such a devastating gamble since the prosecutor has fixed the incentives
for the average case.196

209, 226 (2005) (“Fair treatment enhances satisfaction with the criminal justice system and
improves perceptions of the legitimacy of the law and of the authorities who enforce it. . . .
Perceptions of fair treatment are heavily influenced by symbolic criteria, such as politeness and
respect.”); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 83-84 (2002) (discussing study showing that people’s views of
procedural justice are heavily influenced by such considerations as whether decisionmakers are
polite and show concern for people’s rights).
196
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The reasoning here parallels Stevens’s argument in Apprendi that legislatures
won’t really increase penalties across the board and convert aggravators into
mitigators: both arguments assume a subtle, practical check on the ability of
politically responsive state actors to inflate penalties—even if the inflated
penalties merely operate, at a formal level, as a starting point in the analysis.
In a world of unbounded rationality, it is not clear why a prosecutor going
from high to low would base her initial charge on the “average case,” rather than
charging the legally permissible maximum.197 In a world of cognitive bias,
however, a number of justifications for the practice are apparent. The
prosecutor’s selection of a disproportionately serious charge may have powerful
anchoring effects. The prosecutor may appreciate the difficulty that she would
have in moving a great distance down from the initial charge, and avoid gross
overcharging on that basis; she will understand that if she cannot move far
enough down from the initial charge, she risks wrecking the plea negotiations.198
Moreover, an eventual conviction of a disproportionately high charge, whether
by trial or plea, may be undesirable in and of itself, as the prosecutor may fear the
exhaustion of limited criminal justice resources on relatively minor cases or an
adverse public reaction to undue prosecutorial harshness.199
197

To be sure, ethical standards for prosecutors prohibit using charges “only as a leverage device in
obtaining guilty pleas to lesser charges.” NAT’L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL
PROSECUTION STANDARDS 130 (2d.ed. 1991). Such standards, however, are not enforceable. See
id. at 5 (noting that standards not intended to be basis for sanctions). Our present concern,
moreover, is not with prosecutors who rigorously adhere to the standards, but with prosecutors who
already use the threat of enhanced charges to obtain plea bargaining leverage, and the extent to
which they would simply switch to a different leveraging tactic if prohibited from using threats.
198
As BLE scholars have observed, people in a variety of contexts recognize and take steps to
address the boundedness of their willpower, as by joining “Christmas Clubs” in order to avoid
undersaving. Jolls et al., supra note 17, at 1479.
199
Prosecutors do not always seek the harshest sentence available in every case; indeed, there is
ample evidence that prosecutors will sometimes even act so as to subvert mandatory sentencing
guidelines in order achieve what they believe to be a more appropriate set of sentences. See, e.g.,
Frank O. Bowman, III, & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining
Federal Drug Sentences Including Data From the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 559 (2002)
(“Our work demonstrates that prosecutors . . . use their discretion liberally, but irregularly, to
reduce drug sentences.”). See generally Stuntz, supra note 169, at 2554 (“Once the defendant’s
sentence has reached the level the prosecutor prefers—or, if you like, the level that the local voters
who elect her boss demand—adding more time offers no benefit to the prosecutor. . . . Voters’
preferences, courthouse customs, the prosecutor’s reputation as a tough or lenient bargainer, her
own views about what is a proper sentence for the crime in question—all these things play a role in
defining the sentences that prosecutors are likely to seek in plea bargains.”). See also id. at 2257
(“[W]ho bears the blame if something goes wrong—if sympathetic defendants are punished or if
unsympathetic defendants are punished more harshly than the public thinks just? In the United
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Adding weight to the anchoring effects, there are also framing effects.
Movement up in charges will be seen by the public as a loss for defendants, but
movement down represents a win. In light of tough-on-crime political pressures,
the prosecutor will want to be careful about routinely handing out big wins to
defendants. This consideration, too, would militate against indiscriminately
maximizing initial charges; it is better to set initial charges with some modesty so
that defendants will usually get only small wins in plea negotiations.200
Finally, there is the principle of reciprocal fairness: a prosecutor who
significantly overcharges risks being perceived as unfair by opposing counsel,
which may prompt spiteful responses that make the prosecutor’s life more
difficult, such as more filing of pretrial motions.201
Similarly, unfair
overcharging may leave some defendants feeling more reluctant to plead guilty
or otherwise cooperate with prosecutors. In short, Blackmun’s assumptions
about prosecutorial charging restraint seem at least plausible in a world of
bounded rationality and willpower.
Second, Blackmun reasoned,
It is healthful to keep charging practices visible to the general public, so
that political bodies can judge whether the policy being followed is a fair
one. Visibility is enhanced if the prosecutor is required to lay his cards
on the table with an indictment of public record at the beginning of the
bargaining process, rather than making use of unrecorded verbal
warnings of more serious indictments yet to come.202
This argument, like the first, also rests on an assumption of prosecutorial restraint
in determining the initial charges. Consider an example: a defendant is initially
charged with second-degree murder, but, pursuant to an agreement, ultimately
States, the answer is almost always the overzealous prosecutor, not the overcriminalizing or
oversentencing legislator.”).
200
Not only may prosecutors arouse a negative public reaction by handing out big wins, but they
may also run into difficulties in having their plea deals approved by judges. See King, supra note
192, at 136 (noting that all jurisdictions judges retain authority to review and reject plea deals). For
an example, see Dan Christensen, Florida Judge Complains U.S. Prosecutor Is “Weak-Kneed”,
DAILY
BUSINESS
REV.,
March
18,
2004,
available
at,
MIAMI
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1079144426509 (discussing case in which judge threatened
to reject plea deal in which prosecutor agreed to dismiss two felony drug distribution counts in
return for guilty plea to one misdemeanor possession charge).
201
For a discussion of social science research on spiteful responses to perceived unfairness, see
Jolls et al., supra note 17, at 1494-96.
202
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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pleads guilty only to reckless endangerment. What is the public to make of this
deal? At first blush, it appears that the prosecutor paid a high price for the
defendant’s guilty plea. In the world of the Bordenkircher majority, however,
the initial murder charge may have been far more than the prosecutor actually
thought appropriate, a massive overcharge intended to ensure that only the most
impetuous defendant would actually go to trial. In the dissenters’ world,
however, prosecutors act in a more restrained fashion, only overcharging to the
relatively modest extent necessary to secure a guilty plea from the average
defendant. In the dissenters’ world, the public can more confidently conclude
that the prosecutor has indeed moved a long distance from what she initially
judged to be an appropriate disposition of the case.
Third, Blackmun asserted, “I would question whether it is fair to pressure
defendants to plead guilty by threat of reindictment on an enhanced charge for
the same conduct when the defendant has no way of knowing whether the
prosecutor would indeed be entitled to bring him to trial on the enhanced
charge.”203 The objection, of course, is that defendants always bargain in the face
of uncertain trial outcomes204; it is not clear why the modest additional layer of
uncertainty in Bordenkircher should be accorded particular significance.
Blackmun is nonetheless onto something by raising fairness concerns. A
threat is perceived differently than a offer: the former is framed as a loss, and the
latter as a gain. Powerful loss-aversion instincts may lend considerably greater
coercive power to a threat than a offer. BLE scholars have shown that people
will go to irrational extremes in order to avoid a loss,205 which ought to raise
concerns about whether guilty pleas are as well-considered when made in
response to a threat as they are when made in response to an offer.206 The
defendant, moreover, is likely at least to perceive himself treated less fairly in the
threat scenario: his expectations are shaped by the charges initially filed, but then
203

Id.
See Bibas, supra note 141, at 2493-96 (discussing information deficits that plague plea
negotiations).
205
Id. at 2508. Defense lawyers might, in principle, serve as debiasers for their clients, but, as
Professor Bibas has observed, “[L]awyers vary widely in their knowledge, skill, and incentives to
debias their clients.” Id. at 2520.
206
See Wright, supra note 178, at 84 (arguing that declining federal acquittal rates demonstrate that
prosecutors have accumulated too much power to extract guilty pleas from defendants who might
otherwise win acquittals at trial). A number of recent police misconduct scandals provide further
anecdotal evidence that even innocent defendants will some times take plea deals in order to avoid
the risks of going to trial. . Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2295, 2305 (2006).
204
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the prosecutor suddenly brings the possibility of much worse losses into view.207
This echoes Blakely’s fairness objections to charging a defendant in a way that
indicates one particular maximum penalty, then punishing him in a way that far
exceeds the maximum.208
In sum, the Apprendi Five should not find the Bordenkircher evasion
argument any more persuasive than they found the evasion arguments made by
the Apprendi dissenters. There are good reasons to doubt that regulation of
charging threats would result in dramatic inflation of initial charges. And, even
to the extent that some inflation does occur, there may nonetheless be reasons to
view high-to-low charging as preferable to low-to-high. High-to-low is more
transparent to the public, and is likely perceived by defendants as less coercive
and unfair.
207

In contrast to the bait-and-switch character of low-to-high charging, high-to-low negotiations
are not necessarily as crass as they are sometimes imagined. See Gerard E. Lynch, Screening
Versus Bargaining: What Exactly Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1403 (2003)
(“Most plea negotiations, in fact, are primarily discussions of the merits of the case, in which
defense attorneys point out legal, evidentiary, or practical weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case, or
mitigating circumstances that merit mercy, and argue based on these considerations that the
defendant is entitled to a more lenient disposition than that originally proposed by the prosecutor’s
charge.”). But cf. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1413-14 (2003) (asserting the Lynch’s description of plea bargaining, while
perhaps accurate as to the federal system, does not match the reality of state court practice);
MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS 41 (1977, paperback ed. 1981) (finding within single state system substantial
differences in length of plea discussions and thoroughness with which facts of case were covered).
208
This approach, which focuses on changes to baseline expectations, also resonates with the
abundant philosophical literature on coercion. See Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary
Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 465, 525-26, 530 (2005) (summarizing literature); George C. Thomas III, A Philosophical
Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 79, 86 (1993) (“[A] proposal is a
threat only when it makes [a person’s] condition worse; and it is an offer when it makes [a person’s
condition] better.”); ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 136 (1987) (discussing difficulty of
determining baseline in plea-inducement context). This literature identifies three ways of
determining the baseline: empirical (i.e., what is statistically likely to occur absent the proposal),
phenomenological (i.e., what is subjectively expected to occur absent the proposal), and normative
(i.e., what is expected assuming compliance with moral norms). Thomas, supra, at 87-88.
Assuming that charges are not usually enhanced after they are formally made, and that defendants
do not expect them to be enhanced, then a Bordenkircher-style proposal would amount to a threat
in light of either the empirical or the phenomenological baseline. (And if different baselines
produce different results, then the right baseline to use would be one that reflects the defendant’s
preference as to the future. Id. at 89.) Assuming that the prosecutor intends to deliver a threat and
that the threat actually causes the defendant to plead guilty, then the chief conditions of coercion
have been satisfied. See id. at 83 (outlining basic conditions of coercion).
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IV. DESIGNING A NEW RULE FOR CHARGING THREATS
The previous Part demonstrated why the Apprendi Five should reject
Bordenkircher. Assume now that the Court actually grants certiorari in a new
case that presents a similar fact pattern, with a prosecutor delivering on a threat
of new charges following a break-down in plea negotiations. This Part considers
how the Five might address a hypothetical Bordenkircher II.209 Section A
discusses potential ways that a protective rule might be structured by the Court.
Section B considers the possibility that Justice Stevens, the only holdover on the
Court from the Bordenkircher majority, might defect from the Five in a
hypothetical Bordenkircher II. Finally, Section C considers the consequences of
the proposed rule in more detail, showing that the “doctrinaire formalism” charge
would no more fairly apply in this context than in the Apprendi cases.
A. Structural Options
Part I above described the contrasting protective rules proposed by the
dissenters in Bordenkircher and Goodwin. This Section considers which of the
rules would be most attractive to the Apprendi Five, concluding that Justice
Brennan’s test squares nicely with the Apprendi model.
1. Powell’s Wag-the-Dog Test
Justice Powell’s dissent in Bordenkircher suggested a case-by-case analysis
of whether the trial penalty imposed by the prosecutor exceeded the State’s
legitimate interests in punishing the defendant. Powell’s test offers flexibility
and, assuming the sort of generous understanding of the scope of the State’s
interests suggested by Powell, only minimal intrusiveness by judges into the
charging and plea-inducement process.
Indeed, Justice Stevens himself
seemingly endorsed the Powell test in Goodwin.210
More will be said about Stevens in the next Section, but, for now, note the
basic jurisprudential inconsistency between Powell’s approach and the Apprendi
decisions. Powell’s test employs a standard, instead of a rule, in contrast to
Apprendi’s preference for rule-structure formalism. Powell’s approach, leaving
wide discretion in the judiciary, offers little reassurance that jury-trial rights will
not be progressively eroded, particularly given the institutional incentives for
judges to support prosecutorial practices that result in more guilty pleas and
209

While this Part is written with the possibility of a new United States Supreme Court case in
mind, the proposal developed here might alternatively be adopted by state courts using their
independent authority to construe due process rights under their own state constitutions.
210
Supra Part I.B.2.
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fewer trials.211 For that reason, the Apprendi Five are unlikely to unite behind a
wag-the-dog test.
2. Blackmun’s Actual Motivation Test
Blackmun’s dissent in Bordenkircher suggested a somewhat different
approach: rather than focusing on the state’s interests in punishment, the inquiry
should turn on the prosecutor’s actual motivation in bringing enhanced
charges.212 Where a new charge is added after a break-down in plea negotiations,
a burden-shifting analysis is triggered, requiring the prosecutor to justify her
action on some non-vindictive basis.213 Blackmun seems to have contemplated
something like the Batson test for racial discrimination in jury selection, which
makes use of a similar burden-shifting approach en route to a determination of
whether the prosecutor discriminated against a group of prospective jurors on
account of their race.214
The Batson analogy, however, demonstrates the basic objection to
Blackmun’s approach. Batson has proven notoriously ineffectual in practice.
Prosecutors have little difficulty in providing race-neutral explanations for their
peremptory strikes, and courts have little stomach for probing their actual
motivations once a facially neutral explanation is offered.215 Likewise, one
imagines that reasonably intelligent prosecutors will always be able to point to
something that has changed in order to justify increased charges after the breakdown in plea negotiations: an investigator has come up with a new item of
211

See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1037-38 (2006) (arguing in favor of greater use of formalist rules to preserve separation of powers
in criminal justice system); Stuntz, supra note 169, at 2561 (discussing evidence that judges “are
invested in plea bargaining and try to facilitate it”). Professor Stuntz has suggested a modified
version of the wag-the-dog test, in which the government would be required to “point to some
reasonable number of factually similar cases in which the threatened sentence had actually
imposed, not just threatened.” William J. Stuntz, Bordenkirch v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the
Decline of the Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 373 (Carol S. Steiker ed. 2006).
This seems a move in the right direction, although, as Stuntz himself acknowledges, not all states
collect the sort of data that would make the required showing possible. Id. Additionally, the
proposed requirement might still be overly indeterminate and deferential for the tastes of the
Apprendi Five, leaving open the questions of what is a “reasonable number” and how to know
when cases are sufficiently “factually similar” to count as suitable comparisons.
212
See supra Part I.A.2.
213
Id.
214
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
215
For a recent summary and critique of this Batson case law along these lines, see Antony Page,
Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping an the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155,
166-78 (2005).
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evidence, a victim’s injuries have taken longer than anticipated to heal, the
prosecutor has just learned of a favorable appellate decision, etc. Given the
ephemeral nature of actual motives, the judge will have considerable “wiggle
room” to find in favor of the prosecutor once such a neutral explanation is
offered. And, given the institutional incentives to support plea-bargained
outcomes, one imagines that judges will liberally make use of this wiggle room,
just as they have in the Batson context. In short, Blackmun’s test offers hardly
any firmer protection against the erosion of jury-trial rights than Powell’s wagthe-dog test.
3. Brennan’s Likelihood-of-Deterrence Test
Justice Brennan suggested a third approach in his Goodwin dissent. Brennan
would ask, “Did the elevation of the charges . . . pose a realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness? Is it possible that the fear of such vindictiveness may . . . deter a
person in [the defendant’s] position from exercising his . . . right to a jury
trial?”216 This test focuses neither on the propriety of the charge in the abstract
(Powell’s test) nor on the prosecutor’s motive in bringing the charge
(Blackmun’s), but on the deterrent effects of bringing the charge in the manner in
which it was brought.
a. Adapting the Test to Charging Threats
Goodwin itself did not involve the specific low-to-high plea-bargaining issue
presented by Bordenkircher, but it is not hard to imagine how Brennan would
have applied his test in such circumstances. Where a prosecutor threatens and
then delivers an increased charge in response to a refusal to plead guilty,
defendants will undoubtedly perceive vindictiveness, and there is at least a
realistic likelihood that some will be deterred from exercising their procedural
rights. Brennan’s likelihood-of-deterrent-effects approach might thus be adapted
to the Bordenkircher scenario through the following rule: The Due Process
Clause is violated when, after a defendant has been indicted or otherwise
formally charged, the prosecutor (a) makes a plea offer; (b) in connection with
the offer, threatens to take an action that exposes the defendant to a longer
maximum sentence than would otherwise be possible based on the existing
charge(s); and (c) does take such an action following the defendant’s rejection of
the offer.
In light of the clarity of the rule, it should be easy for prosecutors to avoid
running afoul of it. If a prosecutor has a potential charge that he or she would
216

Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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like to use as a bargaining chip, then the prosecutor has two choices: either (1)
convey the terms of the proposed deal prior to the formalization of charges in an
indictment or information, or (2) include the charge in the indictment or
information. Once post-charging plea negotiations begin, the charge might still
be added—but only until there is an express threat relating to the charge, at
which time the prosecutor would lose the ability to add the charge. (And even at
that point, the prosecutor would still be able to employ any other form of pleainducement that did not increase the defendant’s overall sentencing exposure, for
instance, a promise to stand silent at sentencing.) In order to maintain flexibility
in modifying charges, prosecutors would thus have a strong incentive never to
make the post-charging threat.
Using the rule, a defendant’s proof of vindictiveness in the Bordenkirchertype setting would turn on a handful of objective facts, which should not involve
protracted collateral litigation or undue intrusion into the inner workings of the
prosecutor’s office. To be sure, the rule, as framed here, contains a few legal
ambiguities whose resolution I will leave for another day.217 Yet, the presence of
such legal questions does not render the rule any less bright-line than the
Apprendi test—which has also raised its fair share of legal questions.
b. Consistency With Apprendi (and Other Precedent)
The Apprendi Five should find the proposed rule preferable not only to the
open-ended permissiveness of Bordenkircher, but also to the Blackmun or
Powell approaches. The structure of this rule echoes the formalism of Apprendi,
avoiding ephemeral considerations, such as state interests and prosecutorial
intent, in favor of more objective fact-finding. Moreover, like the Apprendi test,
the proposed test focuses squarely on the fairness of the process to which the
defendant was subject, without regard to the fairness of the outcome as an
abstract proposition.218 Finally, like the Apprendi rule (as clarified in Harris), the
proposed test makes the maximum available sentence the touchstone of the
analysis; it constitutes a baseline against which subsequent changes are assessed.
217

For instance, it would be too easy for prosecutors to evade the rule if they were narrowly
prohibited from bringing only a specific charge that was expressly mentioned in a threat. How
much broader should the prohibition extend, though? To all charges that would satisfy the Double
Jeopardy “same elements” test? Or more broadly to all transactionally related charges? Likewise,
should an analog to the Double Jeopardy Dual Sovereignty Doctrine apply in this context? And
what about charging threats that do not increase the potential maximum prison term (the standard
metric for punishment severity), but that instead increase sentencing exposure in other respects,
such as by triggering a forfeiture statute that would not otherwise be applicable?
218
For instance, the Apprendi Court nowhere asked whether twelve years was, in the abstract, a just
sentence for the defendant’s crime.
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This test, in short, is what the Court should adopt in our hypothetical
Bordenkircher II.
Interestingly, parallels to this rule can be found in other areas of criminal
procedure law. Consider, for instance, the Court’s decisions regarding a
defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent at trial: the Court’s protective
rule prohibits the imposition of any penalty on the defendant for exercising the
right, without regard to such subjective matters as severity or state of mind.219
Griffin v. California offers a classic example.220 During closing arguments, the
prosecutor urged the jury to draw a negative inference against the defendant
because the defendant refused to testify.221 The Court subsequently found the
argument unconstitutional, observing that an adverse comment on the refusal to
testify “is a penalty . . . for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down the
privilege by making its assertion costly.”222
Likewise, the proposed
Bordenkircher II test prohibits prosecutor-imposed penalties that make assertion
of the jury-trial right “costly.”
That said, the approach advocated here is concededly in tension with two
other lines of cases: the pre-Bordenkircher line of cases that approve of pleainducements, and Goodwin and its progeny. Neither set of cases, however, must
necessarily be overturned. Blakely indicates that plea-inducements are not
inconsistent with “common-law values” as long as juries are at least available as
a meaningful check on government over-reaching. In this spirit, the proposed
test does not target plea inducements generally, but only a particular form of plea
inducement that raises especially strong coercion and fairness concerns. As to
Goodwin and its progeny,223 the proposed test does indeed jettison Goodwin’s
system of presumptions and burden-shifting, but only in a narrow set of
circumstances; otherwise, the Goodwin test still applies. The special carve-out
might be justified based on the repeated assertions by the Apprendi Five that the
jury-trial right, consistent with the Framers’ intent, requires particular vigilance
to prevent its erosion.224 Moreover, the proposed rule targets a particular set of
219

For a succinct discussion of the cases, see Godsey, supra note 208, at 492-95.
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
221
Id. at 610-11.
222
Id. at 614.
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See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
224
See, e.g., Jones, 526 U.S. at 246-47. Thus, the proposed rule might not encompass threats that
are not directed to a waiver of the jury-trial right, for instance, if a prosecutor threatened enhanced
charges solely in order to obtain a waiver of the right to appeal, to contest a sentence enhancement,
or to contest civil remedies. Likewise, charging threats directed to obtaining the defendant’s
testimony against another person might not be included. In practice, however, it is often impossible
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circumstances in which there can be little doubt that the prosecutor’s purpose was
to discourage exercise of the right, thereby rendering Goodwin’s intentdetermination inquiry superfluous.
This is not to say that the Five should necessarily avoid a broader
reconsideration of the vindictiveness and plea-inducement case law, but, rather,
to suggest that they can proceed incrementally, precisely as they have done in the
Apprendi line of cases. The charging-threat issue can be addressed through a
narrow holding that leaves other precedent, besides Bordenkircher itself, intact.
B. Should Stevens Adhere to Bordenkircher?
As the only member of the Apprendi Five who voted with the majority in
Bordenkircher, Justice Stevens requires separate consideration. Should he be
willing to reconsider that vote today? In fact, Stevens’s opinion for the Court in
Goodwin suggests that his views are no longer wholly in sync with
Bordenkircher.225 Where Bordenkircher suggested no limitation on plea
inducements, Goodwin seemed to contemplate some sort of wag-the-dog
limitation. Moreover, the fact that Justice Powell (author of the wag-the-dog
dissent in Bordenkircher) actually joined the Goodwin majority lends support to
the view that the Court (and Stevens) had moved between the two opinions.
Assuming that Stevens does indeed agree with the propriety of regulating
plea inducements, would he accept the (rule-structure) formalist test proposed
to disentangle the various motives behind a charging threat; usually, the prosecutor seeks the
defendant’s waiver of a bundle of rights together. In order to make the proposed rule meaningful, it
should encompass “mixed-motive” scenarios, in which a waiver of the jury trial is part of the
package sought by the prosecutor.
225
Indeed, Stevens actually seemed to move away from the most extreme reading of Bordenkircher
the very next term with his dissent in Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978). Corbitt
challenged the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that mandated life imprisonment for
defendants convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, but permitted a lesser penalty for defendants
who pled out. Id. at 215. In upholding the statute, the majority relied heavily on Bordenkircher.
Id. at 221-22. Stevens, in dissent, conceded that the New Jersey statute served the same state
interest as do plea inducements delivered by prosecutors, id. at 231 (Stevens, J., dissenting), but
rejected the majority’s suggestion that the basic legitimacy of this interest shielded all state action
in furtherance of it. Rather, what made the New Jersey statute different than Bordenkircher-type
threats was that the statute mandated “a different standard of punishment depending solely on
whether or not a plea is entered.” Id. at 232 (emphasis added). By contrast, he assumed that
prosecutors would consider “individual factors relevant to the particular case,” rather than making
charging decisions based solely on the defendant’s plea. Id. at 231-32. Stevens seems to be
anticipating Goodwin and backing away from Bordenkircher’s open-ended deference. See
Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 n.11 (“A charging decision does not levy an improper ‘penalty’ unless it
results solely from the defendant’s exercise of a protected legal right . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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here, or would he continue to prefer the wag-the-dog test of Goodwin? There are
at least two good reasons to believe that Stevens would prefer the proposed test.
First, he embraced an analogous test in his McMillan dissent and the
subsequent Apprendi cases. Recall that, in McMillan, Stevens acknowledged that
this test would be easy to circumvent in principle, but he responded by arguing
that political realities would prevent circumvention in practice. As suggested in
the previous Part, similar arguments might be made in response to concerns
about the circumvention of a formalist rule restricting charging threats.
Second, in the years since Bordenkircher and Goodwin, the plea-inducement
playing field has tilted dramatically in favor of prosecutors, creating much more
compelling risks that defendants will be effectively coerced into surrendering
their trial rights. At the time Bordenkircher was decided, draconian sentencing
statutes, like Kentucky’s Habitual Criminal Act, were comparatively rare.
Indeed, Kentucky’s Act was actually softened not long after Paul Hayes’
sentencing.226 Subsequent decades have been a different story. Foreshadowing
the future direction of criminal law, Pennsylvania enacted the mandatory
minimum statute at issue in McMillan in 1982227—the very year Stevens wrote
his opinion in Goodwin. In the years immediately following Goodwin, Congress
began its biennial ritual of adopting new mandatory minimums at the federal
level.228 Many states followed suit, with the trend perhaps reaching its apex with
the adoption of California’s notorious three-strikes law in 1994.229 The upshot is
that prosecutors now routinely have the ability to make the sort of extreme
charging threats used against Paul Hayes. While the holding in Bordenkircher
rested, in part, on the Court’s view that prosecution and defense “arguably
possess relatively equal bargaining power,”230 such an assertion would be nearly
laughable today.231
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Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 371 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81.
228
See Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Booker Project: The Future of Federal Sentencing, 43
HOUSTON L. REV. 269, 271 n.13 (summarizing important federal mandatory minimum statutes).
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FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT
IN CALIFORNIA ix (2001).
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Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 667.
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See, e.g., LOWENTHAL, supra note 169, at 112 (describing defense lawyers’ “bitter[ness]”
regarding “tilt of the playing field”); Standen, supra note 166, at 1473-74 (“[P]rosecutors possess
and have the incentive to exercise substantial power to overwhelm criminal defendants in the plea
bargaining process.”).
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Stevens has been an acute and concerned observer of these trends, and made
note of them in his Apprendi and Booker opinions. Indeed, in Booker, he framed
the Apprendi line of cases this way:
As enhancements became greater [after McMillan], the jury’s finding of the
underlying crime became less significant. And the enhancements became
very serious indeed. . . . [T]he Court was faced with the issue of preserving
an ancient guarantee under a new set of circumstances.232
Similarly, this same “new set of circumstances” should cause also Stevens to
consider the need for modifying prosecutorial vindictiveness law in order to
preserve the same “ancient guarantee.” Neither the open-ended permissiveness
of Bordenkircher nor the nearly-as-deferential approach of Goodwin plausibly
provide the sort of robust safeguard that Stevens later demanded in Apprendi.
C. More “Doctrinaire Formalism?”
Would modifying Bordenkircher as proposed be anything more than an
exercise in “doctrinaire formalism”? In other words, would a post-Bordenkircher
II world be any different than the present world, and, if so, would the changes be
in any sense appealing ones? The previous Part set forth the basic argument that,
taking into account the underlying logic of the Apprendi decisions, the Court
could indeed regulate charging threats in a meaningful manner. With a specific
proposal now on the table, this Section develops the earlier argument in a more
detailed fashion.
We should begin with an account of current charging and plea-inducement
practices. Characterizing such practices is a difficult task, for every prosecutorial
office has its own policies and culture, and many offices leave considerable
discretion in the hands of the line prosecutor. That said, one may hazard a few
generalizations. First, in run-of-the-mill cases, initial charging decisions are
often made by prosecutors based chiefly on information and recommendations
supplied by police officers, without a great deal of independent investigation,
research, or deliberation.233 Thus, the prosecutor may have little information
about, for instance, potential defenses in the case, witness credibility issues and
232

Booker, 543 U.S. at 236-37.
The rigor of prosecutorial charge-screening may vary considerably by jurisdiction. Darryl K.
Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93
CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1600 n.47 (2005). For a description of the charging processes of the New
Orleans District Attorney’s office, which devotes an extraordinary amount of resources and care to
the initial charging decision, see Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining
Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 62-63 (2002).
233
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similar sources of litigation risk, and (other than criminal history) the background
and character of the defendant.234 Second, given the broad scope and many
overlapping provisions of contemporary criminal codes,235 as well as the low
level of proof required to initiate a criminal case,236 the prosecutor will typically
have a range of permissible charging options, which will expose the defendant to
greater or lesser degrees of punishment. Third, taking into account informational
limitations and the need for later plea-inducement flexibility, initial charges are
typically a bit harsher than what the prosecutor actually thinks would be the
optimal resolution of the case.237 Fourth, the prosecutor will not typically pursue
every conceivable charge in every case.238 Fifth, given that prosecutors, defense
lawyers, and sometimes defendants themselves are repeat players in the system,
prosecutors are usually (but not always) quite successful in setting an initial
charge that permits enough downward movement to induce a plea while still
producing a final result that lies within the range of what the prosecutor considers
an appropriate response to the crime. Sixth, in addition to modifying charges, the
prosecutor typically has a range of additional means to induce pleas, which might
include, for instance, the promise of a favorable sentencing recommendation, an
offer to stipulate to particular sentencing factors, or an agreement not to pursue
civil remedies. Because such devices do not involve the formal filing of new
charges and related transaction costs (arraignment, preliminary hearing, fresh
234

See Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 1983 (discussing information asymmetry between prosecution
and defense). In some cases, prosecutors become actively involved in the investigative process. In
such cases, prosecutors are apt to have more information available, but may be less able to assess
the information in unbiased manner. Brown, supra note 233, at 1600. Either way, the prosecutor
may initiate criminal proceedings without a realistic sense of potential weaknesses in her case. One
notable exception may be in federal white-collar cases, in which defense lawyers “almost always
actively attempt, from a very early stage, to influence the conclusions of the prosecutor.” Gerard E.
Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2126 (1998).
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See, e.g., LOWENTHAL, supra note 169, at 104-05 (describing charging options made possible by
overlapping crime definitions in one case).
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See id. at 98 (discussing probable cause standard used for charging purposes).
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See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 206, at 2331 (discussing “safety margin” built into charging
decisions). Professor Alschuler has provided a helpful taxonomy of “overcharging,” which
includes vertical overcharging (“charging a single offense at a higher level than the circumstances
of the case seem to warrant”) and different forms of horizontal overcharging (e.g., charging a
defendant with a separate offense for each criminal transaction in which he participated). Albert
W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85-87 (1968).
238
Charging restraint, however, varies among jurisdictions and by type of case. See, e.g.,
LOWENTHAL, supra note 169, at 105 (describing policy of Maricopa County, Arizona, to charge
most serious possible crime when gun was used). To the extent that prosecutors already routinely
charge the maximum in particular categories of cases, then concerns about prosecutors “upping the
ante” in response to our hypothetical Bordenkircher II are moot.
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discovery demands, and so forth), prosecutors will often find them preferable to
the tactic of threatening enhanced charges. And, finally, because plea deals can
usually be reached quickly and easily within the standard high-to-low
framework, plea-bargaining more frequently follows this pattern than the low-tohigh approach exemplified by Bordenkircher. (By “standard high-to-low,” I
mean that initial charges build in some bargaining room, but do not encompass
every conceivable crime that could be charged. I will refer to the latter approach
as “super high-to-low.”)
With these assumptions in mind, let us now consider potential prosecutorial
responses to our hypothetical Bordenkircher II.239
1. Option One: Do Nothing
Prosecutors might respond to our hypothetical holding in Bordenkircher II by
charging as they always have. This, in fact, seems a likely response in many
jurisdictions. Not only is it consistent with the recognizable inertia of all social
institutions, but it also reflects the fact that prosecutors are generally quite
successful in setting initial charges in such a way as to induce a guilty plea.
Given the range of plea-inducement tools otherwise available, prosecutors in
many—perhaps most—jurisdictions are unlikely to miss the option of threatening
more serious charges except in a small number of unusual cases. For many
prosecutors, the potential for these occasional cases will not justify the costs of
developing a systematic response to Bordenkircher II.
To the extent that “do nothing” is the prosecutorial response of choice, the
post-Bordenkircher II world would not look dramatically different than the
present. Most defendants would experience the criminal justice system precisely
as they do now. Some defendants, however, would be spared threats of enhanced
charges. In some of their cases, a plea deal will be reached anyway because the
prosecutor is willing to make sufficient additional concessions to the defendant.
In others, the upshot will be a trial that would not have otherwise occurred.
Overall, the effects of Bordenkircher II would look like the effects that the
Apprendi Five anticipated would flow from their earlier decisions: a few more
trials and a bit more plea-bargaining leverage for some defendants. While such
239

While the proposed rule is not, technically, a ban on charge-threats during plea negotiations, I
assume that prosecutors would treat the rule in that way. Because defense counsel would recognize
that charging threats were ineffectual, such threats would not carry much plea-inducement weight;
therefore, prosecutors would have little incentive to make them. Thus, while one potential
drawback of the rule is that, once a charging threat was made, a prosecutor would be unable to
adjust charges upward based even on legitimate reasons, such as newly discovered evidence, this
should not be a serious problem in practice.
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results are certainly not cost-free to society,240 they do seem consistent with the
overarching vision of a more robust role for the jury, greater limitations on the
coercive power of the state, and greater fairness, as perceived by defendants.241
2. Option Two: Up the Ante Across the Board
The Bordenkircher and Goodwin majorities feared that prohibiting low-tohigh would simply cause prosecutors to switch to a more aggressive version of
high-to-low, upping the ante across the board with tougher initial charges. Recall
that at present prosecutors do not always charge every conceivable crime in every
case. Were prosecutors broadly to adopt a “super high-to-low” strategy, then our
hypothetical holding in Bordenkircher II could indeed be accused of perverse
consequences. At best, cases would simply be resolved on the same terms as
they are now, albeit sometimes following a different path (high-to-low instead of
the reverse). At worst, many defendants might actually be harmed in a number
of respects, such as by facing greater stigma and more onerous bail conditions as
a result on the higher initial charges.242
These concerns, however, should be greeted with some skepticism. First, as
suggested in the previous Subsection, there are good reasons to doubt whether
prosecutors would assume the transaction costs of broad, systematic responses to
Bordenkircher II, when prosecutors can generally reach comfortable results
within the standard high-to-low framework. Second, to the extent there is a
systematic response, prosecutors will be wary of inflating initial charges across
the board. As discussed in the previous Part, inflating initial charges may make it
much harder, in light of anchoring and framing effects, for prosecutors ultimately
to reach negotiated outcomes that are satisfactory to them. Moreover, in light of
reciprocal fairness tendencies, prosecutors also risk a backlash of uncooperative
behavior from defendants and defense counsel.
240
See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TULANE L. REV. 695, 704-05 (2001)
(noting social benefits of plea bargains, including reduced costs and reduced time lag between the
offense and the punishment, which benefits defendants subject to pretrial detention and potentially
enhances deterrent effects).
241
Even a small incremental increase in the number of trials may have great significance in a
system like ours where trials have become exceedingly rare. See Wright, supra note 178, at 83
n.12 (2005) (noting that if acquittals become too rare, then “they cannot serve their market
discipline function during plea negotiation”).
242
The Court expressed precisely this concern in Goodwin. 457 U.S. at 380 n.10. More onerous
bail conditions are perhaps of special concern; they not only increase the likelihood of pretrial
detention, but may also thereby shape the ultimate disposition of the case. See Bibas, supra note
141, at 2492-93 (noting that pretrial detention impairs the defendant’s ability to mount a defense
and, in small cases, increases pressure on the defendant to take a plea deal quickly).
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Finally, to the extent that prosecutors do choose to up the ante across the
board, we should recognize that this will not necessarily represent an unmitigated
loss for defendants.243 While upping the ante would produce a period of
instability in criminal practice, there would ultimately be a new equilibrium in
which judges (certainly) and the public (possibly) would be able to recognize that
charges have been inflated and discount accordingly. For instance, when judges
recognize that today’s aggravated assault charge was yesterday’s simple assault,
and today’s attempted murder yesterday’s aggravated assault, then judges will
likely discount today’s bail conditions, at least to some extent, in order to account
for the change.244 At the same time, for reasons discussed in the previous Part,
even when high-to-low and low-to-high produce the same outcomes, there is
good reason to believe that the two tactics are perceived differently by
defendants. Given the different ways that losses and gains are experienced,
defendants might perceive high-to-low as fairer and less coercive. Whatever
costs defendants bear, those costs should be considered in light of the benefits of
perceived gains in fairness.245
3. Option Three: Up the Ante Selectively
If prosecutors do not wish to bear the potential costs of upping the ante
across they board, they might instead up the ante selectively, targeting categories
of defendants who tend to be particularly resistant to conventional plea
inducements within the standard high-to-low framework. It is not entirely clear
what categories these would be, but one is readily identifiable: defendants who
believe themselves innocent, or otherwise likely to prevail at trial, are likely
particularly resistant to standard plea inducements. This tendency may be
explained in light of framing effects and loss-aversion; whereas the knowingly
243

Of course, there are likely some discrete categories of defendants (serious recidivists, gangsters,
terrorists, and the like) against whom prosecutors are already filing all plausible charges, either for
public relations purposes or out of a genuine desire to obtain the maximum possible sentence. The
prosecution of such defendants should be unchanged by Bordenkircher II; there was never any
room for threatening them with higher charges, so losing the ability to make the threat cannot affect
the plea-bargaining or litigation process.
244
Anchoring effects, however, suggest that the discounting will not be complete.
245
Enhanced perceptions of fairness may produce important long-term benefits for both the
defendant and the community. For instance, in an important body of theoretical and empirical
work, Professor Tyler and various colleagues have identified a link between perceptions of fair
treatment, beliefs in the legitimacy of legal institutions, and voluntary deference to the law and
legal authorities. See, e.g., TYLER & HO, supra note 195, at xiv-xv, 12. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (“[S]ociety has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic
fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding
reactions to arbitrariness.”).
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guilty defendant likely welcomes a standard plea deal as a gain, an “innocent”
defendant will see the agreement to plead guilty to any charge as a loss.
In light of these considerations, prosecutors in a post-Bordenkircher II world
would have more of an incentive to determine before the start of plea-bargaining
which defendants have a real claim of innocence or other grounds for optimism.
However, an early, thorough review of the merits of the case by the prosecutor
would be a welcome development.246 For instance, BLE scholarship suggests
that early review would help prosecutors better appreciate defendant perspectives
before positions harden in the charging and negotiation process and thereby
facilitate the declination or voluntary dismissal of inappropriate charges.247
These benefits, however, might be offset by an unfortunate effect of closer
prosecutorial scrutiny in the early stages of the case: aggressive prosecutors
anxious to ensure adequate plea-inducement leverage might inflate the initial
charges against defendants whose optimism is both strong and misplaced.248 In
these circumstances, whatever negative consequences flow from the super highto-low tactic (e.g., tougher bail condition, greater stigma) might effectively be
distributed on the basis of the sorts of circumstances that cause defendants to take
an unjustifiably optimistic view of their situation, such as incompetent legal
counsel, poor cognitive functioning, or simple inexperience with the criminal
justice system—all circumstances unrelated to the actual severity of the crime.
While it is possible to identify some categories of defendants as to whom
prosecutors may wish to inflate initial charges, note that prosecutors already have
incentives to be unusually aggressive in charging these defendants. At present,
246

See Wright & Miller, supra note 233, at 95 (noting benefits of pre-charge screening by
prosecutors).
247
See Burke, supra note 169, at 1614-15 (“Because the theory of guilt triggers sources of
cognitive bias, prosecutorial neutrality should be at its peak prior to the prosecutor’s charging
decision . . . .”); Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative
Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 602-620 (2002) (discussing empirical evidence supporting
theory of cognitive consistency, which predicts tendency to hold on to beliefs in face of
disconfirming evidence, particularly where there has been public commitment to belief). A leading
criticism of plea-bargaining is that it leads to the conviction of innocent defendants. Gazal-Ayal,
supra note 206, at 2297. As Professor Gazal-Ayal has recently pointed out, the root cause of the
problem is that the strength of plea inducements leave prosecutors with insufficient incentives to
screen out weak cases at the charging stage. Id. at 2298-99. Any marginal decrease in the
prosecutor’s plea-inducement leverage, as by restricting the use of charging threats, should result in
some marginal increase in the incentives to screen better.
248
Professor Schulhofer has also argued that, if prosecutors could overcome information barriers to
determine which defendants truly believe themselves innocent, they would respond with a more
aggressive approach to plea inducement. Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 1984.
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however, prosecutors may resist these incentives, knowing that they retain the
ability to threaten increased charges if the usual plea inducements prove
inadequate. Our hypothetical holding in Bordenkircher II would cancel the
insurance policy, leaving prosecutors somewhat more likely to adopt the super
high-to-low strategy. Such a change might indeed impose costs on some
defendants. Other groups of defendants, however, may benefit, particularly to
the extent that closer pre-charging examination of cases leads prosecutors to
decline the more dubious ones up front. Moreover, as discussed in the previous
Subsection, costs also need to be weighed in light of perceptions of greater
fairness in a system that does not employ explicit threats in order to extract
waivers of constitutional rights.
4. Option Four: Engage in More Pre-Charge Bargaining
If a prosecutor fears the loss of a post-charging plea-inducement tool (the
threat of higher charges), then another logical response would be to secure the
plea agreement before filing charges. At this point, charges are still inchoate, and
defendants may not have any clear expectation of what they will be; it is
accordingly difficult to speak in terms of a “threat to increase charges,” and our
hypothetical Bordenkircher II rule would be inapplicable.
There are good reasons, however, to doubt that prosecutors would routinely
conclude plea deals before filing charges. For one thing, no right to counsel
attaches before the initiation of adversary proceedings,249 and prosecutors will
not relish the inefficiencies and potential misconduct claims arising from direct
negotiation with an unrepresented lay defendant.250 For another, defendants held
in custody are generally entitled to a probable cause determination within 48
hours of arrest.251 There are obvious efficiency benefits to combining this
determination with the arraignment process, but doing so may leave little time for
the prosecutor to negotiate a pre-charge deal. In light of these sorts of
constraints, increased pre-charge bargaining seems most likely in two types of
cases: (1) white-collar cases in which the defendant is capable of securing
counsel prior to the initiation of adversary proceedings,252 and (2) routine, high-
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United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984).
See, e.g., Wright & Miller, supra note 233, at 78-79 (explaining absence of pre-charge
bargaining in New Orleans based on lack of public defender availability between bail hearing and
arraignment).
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County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
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See Lynch, supra note 234, at 2126 (discussing routine pre-indictment contact between
prosecutors and defense counsel in white-collar cases).
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volume cases for which prosecutors may develop standard, take-it-or-leave-it
plea offers, such as those used by many United States Attorneys’ Offices for
illegal reentry cases.253
Increased pre-charge bargaining would not necessarily be either unfair to
defendants or unwelcome as a matter of policy. An early deal compresses the
period of uncertainty faced by the defendant, and may lessen the likelihood that
defendants will develop firm expectations as to how the case will be handled that
are later dashed. Additionally, because an early deal relieves the prosecutor of
various procedural burdens, such as the need to obtain an indictment or show
probable cause at a preliminary hearing, the prosecutor may be willing to pay a
premium for the defendant’s agreement to plead guilty.254 While an early deal
may mean that the defendant (or the prosecutor, for that matter) may lack
important information that would later come to light, this cost may be offset by
the benefit of negotiations that occur outside the shadow of the cognitive bias
that arises when the prosecutor publicly commits to a particular set of charges
and a particular theory of the case.255 Finally, to the extent that early plea deals
reduce the transaction costs borne by prosecutors, judges, and public defenders,
more resources will be available for other purposes (including the potential
increase in trials resulting from a prohibition on threats of increased charges).
5. Option Five: Do More Sentence-Bargaining
If prosecutors lose some flexibility in using their charging power for pleainducement purposes, some may respond with greater use of sentence-related
inducements.256 Depending on the particulars of sentencing law and practice in
the jurisdiction, such inducements may take any of a number of different forms.
For instance, in order to induce a plea, a prosecutor may offer to stand silent at
sentencing or to recommend a particular sentence that the defendant would view
as a favorable outcome. Alternatively, in some jurisdictions, a plea agreement
may be made contingent on a specific sentence or sentencing range.257 Or, more
modestly, a prosecutor might offer to stipulate to a specific sentencing factor,
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See O’Hear, supra note 16, at 789 (describing federal “early disposition” programs).
For instance, in the federal early disposition programs, defendants receive a special “downward
departure” under the federal sentencing guidelines. Id.
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See Stern, supra note 247, at 640-43 (providing justification based on cognitive consistency
theory for analogous practice of “regulatory negotiation,” in which stakeholders negotiate over a
proposed rule before rule is formally published).
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To be sure, charging-related inducements affect the ultimate sentence by triggering a particular
statutory sentencing range. By “sentence-related inducements,” I mean inducements that affect the
selection of a sentence within that statutory range.
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See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
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such as amount of drugs or mitigating role in the offense, or agree not to seek a
sentence enhancement on the basis of a particular factor. In all such forms of
“sentence-bargaining,” the prosecutor makes an offer or threat relating to the
selection of a specific sentence within the applicable statutory maximum.
Because sentence-bargaining is already common in many jurisdictions,258 and
not a practicable alternative in others,259 it is far from clear that a ban on
Bordenkircher-style threats would meaningfully increase frequency of the
practice. To the extent the practice increased, some defendants might prefer the
change, which would potentially leave them with a perception of greater control
over the sentencing process and greater certainty as to the outcome. On the other
hand, there is cause for legitimate concern over sentence-bargaining. The
practice diminishes the visibility, and hence accountability, of the sentencing
process, and may lead to unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly
situated offenders. Additionally, threats to seek sentence enhancements, even
within a given statutory maximum, may be no less coercive and perceived as no
less unfair than threats to seek an increased maximum. It is not clear, then, that
defendants would gain from a switch on the margins from Bordenkircher-style
charge-bargaining to similar threat-based sentence-bargaining. At the same time,
there seems no compelling reason to conclude that a switch from charge threats
to sentence threats would constitute a loss for defendants.
6. Option Six: Make Implicit Threats
If prosecutors lose the ability to make express charging threats, then some
might attempt to make implicit threats, as by routinely pursuing additional
charges against defendants who refuse plea deals. The prosecutor would hope to
develop a reputation for this practice among defense lawyers, so that defendants
would be routinely counseled to take the prosecutor’s offer. This would be an
258

See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91
NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285 (1997) (estimating that plea bargaining results in circumvention of
federal sentencing guidelines in 20 to 35 percent of cases).
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In jurisdictions without sentencing guidelines and with a strong tradition of judicial control of
sentencing, for instance, the prosecutor’s sentencing-related bargaining chips will have little value.
See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 80 (1998) (“[In the pre-guidelines federal system] in many districts . . . prosecutors
generally refrained from rendering specific sentencing recommendations to the judge, and the judge
would neither elicit nor condone such recommendations.”); Wright & Miller, supra note 233, at 7980 (describing absence of sentence bargaining in New Orleans); King, supra note 192, at 136
(“Judges more readily reject sentence agreements than charge bargains, considering the selection of
an appropriate sentence to be within their special domain . . . .”).
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unfortunate practice, perhaps even worse than an express Bordenkircher-style
threat, which at least has the virtue of giving the trial-bound defendant a clear
opportunity to avoid the “threatened” charge.
There are some natural checks on this practice. The transaction costs of new
charges may deter some prosecutors from routine charge enhancements. Others
will avoid the practice because it offends their sense of fairness. Still others will
be reluctant to subvert a clearly articulated constitutional norm of no threats.
In order to buttress these tendencies, however, courts should be willing to
entertain “implicit threat” claims from defendants who were subject to pretrial
charge increases. These claims might proceed along two lines. First, the
prosecutor might be required to provide a neutral explanation for the charge
increase. For reasons described in an earlier Section, however, this sort of
requirement is not likely to provide a meaningful check on prosecutors. Thus,
defendants should be permitted to present evidence of past practices so as to
establish a pattern of routine charge enhancements, either on the individual
prosecutor level or the office level. Unfortunately, there is no obvious line to be
drawn here, and courts will not have an easy time deciding when the rate of
charge enhancements reaches a level sufficient to demonstrate “a realistic
likelihood of vindictiveness.”260 Just permitting the claims, however, may have a
salutary effect, as prosecutors will doubtless wish to avoid coming close to the
line and thereby prompting burdensome collateral litigation.261 Prosecutors could
easily do so by exercising care in their initial charging decisions and making a
habit of standing by those initial decisions. (And, as indicated above, improved
initial charging is both viable and desirable on a number of grounds.262)
7. Summary
In weighing the actual consequences of the hypothetical holding in
Bordenkircher II, it may be helpful to distinguish among three categories of
defendants: (1) those who would not have been subject in any event to
Bordenkircher-style charging threats; (2) those who would have been subject to
such threats and pled guilty; and (3) those who would have been subject to such
260

See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 223 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I assume that the defendant would have to make some sort of minimal threshold showing in
order to trigger full-blown litigation of the issue. This showing should not, however,
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threats and gone to trial. Those in the first category will not likely be much
affected by the holding. There may be some adverse consequences on the
margins to the extent that prosecutors respond by upping the initial charging ante.
However, these effects are not likely to be profound or widespread, and may be
offset by the benefits of, for instance, increased pre-charge investigation and
bargaining.
Those in the second category will be spared charging threats. Some will go
to trial as a result. Of these, some will win, and some will lose; and, of those
who lose, some may actually be worse off, from a sentencing standpoint, than if
they had taken advantage of the plea deal offered to them.263 Still, all who go to
trial will have the advantage of a process they preferred to a bargained resolution,
and all should perceive greater fairness than in a system that promises a right to a
trial but expressly penalizes those who invoke it.
Some in the second category will opt, even in the absence of a charging
threat, to plead guilty, perhaps as a result of sentencing threats, enhanced initial
charges, or a simple failure of nerve. On the whole, one imagines that these
defendants will be better off insofar as Bordenkircher II removes one, sometimes
quite powerful, device from the prosecutor’s plea-inducement toolbox. While
some defendants may suffer a net loss (e.g., by facing higher initial charges),
there are good reasons to doubt that such results will be widespread; in general, a
prosecutor’s loss of one source of plea-inducement leverage should strengthen,
not weaken, the defendant’s negotiating position.
Those in the third category should most clearly benefit from Bordenkircher
II. These defendants are bound for trial regardless of the prosecutor’s best efforts
to the contrary; the only question is what charges they will face. Under
Bordenkircher II, those charges will often be less than they would have been
under Bordenkircher I. To be sure, some will face the same charges they would
have otherwise faced because the prosecutor will have upped the ante in the
initial charges. But, again, there are good reasons to doubt that such results will
be universal. Many category-three defendants will unambiguously benefit from
Bordenkircher II, and few will unambiguously suffer.264
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The judge, for instance, may impose a “trial penalty” on the defendant at sentencing. See, e.g.,
Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea,
Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 961-62 (2005).
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Some category-three defendants may suffer a net loss if the prosecutor makes sentencing threats
that the prosecutor would not have made if charging threats had been available, the defendant loses
at trial, and the prosecutor’s delivery on the sentencing threats results in a longer sentence than
would have otherwise been imposed. One imagines, however, that these cases would be rare. For
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These defendants, moreover, are defendants for whom we should feel a
particular solicitude. By their determination to go to trial, the category-three
defendants are likely signaling one or more of the following conditions: a firm
belief in their innocence, unusual optimism regarding their chances of winning at
trial, extraordinary bullheadedness, ineffective legal counsel, and/or an
expectation that the results of a conviction will be especially onerous. Under
Bordenkricher I, as the dissenters in the case suggested,265 defendants are
effectively penalized for these sorts of circumstances, even though they have no
legitimate bearing on the defendants’ blameworthiness. Indeed, if anything, the
defendant’s firm belief in his own innocence should raise serious questions about
the defendant’s culpability.
In sum, there are good reasons to believe that Bordenkircher II will have real
effects on the outcomes of some cases; this is not a matter of “doctrinaire
formalism” in the sense that any potential consequences of the holding will be
swamped by prosecutorial circumvention. Nor is it a matter of doctrinaire
formalism in the perverse consequences sense. While one must concede a
likelihood that some defendants will suffer worse outcomes as a result of the
holding, there are good reasons to doubt that these effects will be widespread.
Other defendants should be unambiguously better off, and some of these are
among the most vulnerable in the system.
There may also be broader, if more subtle, benefits. The hypothetical
holding in Bordenkircher II would provide prosecutors with additional incentives
to do more investigation and negotiation before filing charges; this may promote
more judicious charging decisions, more efficient negotiation and litigation
processes, and reduced uncertainty for defendants and victims. Bordenkircher II
would also invite prosecutors to reconsider whether they overvalue the goal of
speedy convictions, and perhaps contribute to stronger due process norms in
connection with plea-inducement. Finally, Bordenkircher II would signal
defendants that the system takes constitutional rights seriously and that even
prosecutors operate in a rule-bound fashion; this may strengthen respect for the
system and promote compliance with the rules that the system lays down for
defendants.266
instance, it is not clear why a prosecutor who was willing to use charging threats under
Bordenkircher I would withhold sentencing threats, on which the transaction costs of followthrough are often less.
265
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 366 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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See supra note 245. While this Article most directly addresses the Apprendi Five, the same
considerations that would justify their overturning Bordenkircher would also justify experimental
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V. CONCLUSION
Apprendi’s critics can be forgiven for using the “doctrinaire formalism”
label: there is a real gap in the Apprendi decisions between the rhetoric and the
rule. The decisions amount to incrementalism disguised as absolutism. They
give the appearance of absolutism because of their frequent invocation of a
romantic ideal of the jury as a check on government oppression, because of their
express rejection of efficiency and uniformity as legitimate grounds on which to
limit access to juries, and because their legal test permits no prudential case-bycase balancing of interests. Yet, this apparent absolutism is an illusion. The
decisions allow, indeed expressly contemplate, both discretionary sentencing by
judges and negotiated guilty pleas. In a world in which these practices are
allowed to persist, jury fact-finding for sentencing purposes will always be the
exception, not the norm.
The Court’s failure to live up to its absolutist rhetoric does not necessarily
mean that the Court is failing to advance the basic values embraced by the
rhetoric. And the Apprendi decisions do indeed provide for at least incremental
progress. The decisions limit the range of legislative options in structuring
sentencing systems. Denied their most preferred choice, many states will
(indeed, many already have) adopt jury fact-finding. And while many defendants
will surrender their right to such fact-finding, not all will. Apprendi and its
progeny should therefore result in at least an incremental increase in the reliance
on juries for sentencing purposes. And in those cases in which defendants do
bargain away their jury rights, they will often be able to obtain additional
concessions in the process, thereby marginally diminishing prosecutorial
domination of the system. In jurisdictions that do not adopt jury fact-finding, the
likely response will be discretionary sentencing. While a switch to discretionary
sentencing does not necessarily enhance democratic control, it also incrementally
advances the ideal of checks and balances in the exercise of state power. In
short, while the Apprendi decisions do not require states to adopt sentencing
systems that fully embody “common law values,” they at least steer states in the
right direction.
In this Article, I have suggested how this type of incrementalism, in the
service of the same underlying values, might lead to a new approach to the
regulation of charging threats by state and local legislatures and executive authorities. Such
experiments would offer the ancillary benefit of empirical data to aid in the assessment of costs and
benefits of different regulatory approaches. Such data, in turn, may contribute to the elaboration or
modification of the constitutional rule proposed here. Cf. Booker, 543 U.S. at 237 (noting Court’s
need to adjust to “new circumstances” in order to preserve jury-trial right).
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regulation of Bordenkircher-style charging threats. The goal here is not to steer
legislatures in the right direction, but prosecutors. In some cases, the
prosecutor’s most preferred choice is to charge the defendant one way and then
threaten enhanced charges in order to extract a guilty plea. Denied the
opportunity to do so, prosecutors may respond in any of a number of different
ways, some considerably more attractive than others. On the whole, though,
there is good reason to believe that the rule proposed here will result in an
incremental increase in the number of jury trials, an incremental decrease in the
scope of prosecutorial domination, and an enhanced perception among
defendants that the system operates in a fair, predictable, and respectful manner.
One drawback to incrementalism, of course, is that the line-drawing will
always seem a bit arbitrary. There is always an argument that some other
increment best strikes the balance between protecting the right at issue,
minimizing disruptions, and preserving flexibility. While a number of such
arguments may be made in the present context, one in particular stands out as
requiring some commentary. The most troubling limitation to the Court’s
incrementalism in the Apprendi line of cases is the exception for mandatory
minimums, as confirmed in Harris.267 For purposes of symmetry, I have, with
some reluctance, incorporated the same exception into the proposed
Bordenkircher II rule.
The Harris exception is unfortunate, but not such a gaping loophole as to
wholly undermine the Apprendi rule. While some jurisdictions may adopt more
mandatory minimums, or convert sentencing guidelines into mandatory
minimums, in response to the Apprendi decisions, not all jurisdictions have done
so or (in light of prison budget concerns, if nothing else) are likely to do so.268
Moreover, the Harris exception may be exploited only to the extent that the
mandatory minimum lies within the statutory maximum. The Harris exception
thus carries its greatest significance in cases in which the offense of conviction
provides a generous statutory maximum, but has much less room to operate in the
context of less serious offenses. For instance, in Bordenkircher itself, although
the Habitual Criminal Act was framed as a mandatory minimum, it would not
have escaped the proposed charging threats rule because the minimum (life) far
exceeded the maximum for the underlying offense (ten years).
267
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That said, it would be preferable to reject the Harris exception in both the
sentencing factor and the charging threats context.269 Indeed, this would not
really be inconsistent with the views of the Apprendi Five, four of whom
dissented in Harris, but only inconsistent with the views of Justice Scalia. He
should reconsider.270 The political constraints on the adoption of mandatory
minimums are not nearly as reassuring as the political constraints on the adoption
of inverted sentencing. Mandatory minimums further empower prosecutors,
especially when they can be triggered through the relaxed procedures available
for “sentencing factors,” which is inconsistent with the checks-and-balances
ideal.
And Blakely’s fairness objections to out-of-the-blue sentence
enhancements seem no less compelling as to minimums than as to maximums.
The plea-inducement system—what Judge Lynch aptly terms “our
administrative system of criminal justice”271—is likely with us for the long haul,
and that is not necessarily a bad thing. The challenge is to develop legal rules so
as to bring some semblance of checks and balances to the system, to dispel the
perception (and sometimes the reality) of momentous decisions about human
liberty being dictated by prosecutors according to their own whims, biases, and
personal convenience.272 With or without a mandatory minimum exception,
overturning Bordenkircher would be a very good place to start.
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